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Abstract  
 
The U.S./Canadian border is in the process of being renegotiated 
as a result of larger processes of redefining and reimagining sovereign 
territories in North America.  New understandings of U.S. and Canadian 
state sovereignty are creating a conflated “other” of cross-border flows: an 
illegitimate migrant figure who is securitized, criminalized and 
disembodied.  The contemporary “othering” of the migrant has serious 
human rights implications such as the restriction of access to refugee 
protection.  U.S. and Canadian states share an agenda of migration 
control executed through the manipulation of geography and the figure of 
the migrant.   
On paper, the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) aims to 
enhance refugee protection and increase border security.  In practice, 
STCA makes the U.S./Canadian border a battleground for obtaining 
access to asylum, thus eroding refugee protection in North America and 
threatening the security of asylum seekers, the U.S. and Canadian states.   
In order to evaluate STCA, I conducted field interviews during 2006 
and 2007 with persons working in the U.S. and Canadian governments as 
well as outside the governments in both countries on STCA.  Through my 
analysis of these discussions, official policy documents and relevant 
literature, I offer three different readings of STCA.  This provides a context 
for STCA and uncovers the motivations for the signing of the policy.   
The U.S./Canadian STCA functions as an exclusionary measure in 
a broader field of exclusions: reconfigurations of the border, state 
sovereignty, territorial limits of the state and the figure of the migrant which 
aim to reduce the access to and the quality of asylum.     
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I leave you with the story of Charles, a Haitian refugee living in 
Binghamton who was searching for his son in order to bring him to the 
U.S. as a refugee through family reunification: 
 
Me: I’m sorry we have not received any information on your son. 
 
Charles: Thank you for your help.  I will visit next week.  God bless you!  
God bless you!   
 
Me: Are you worried about your son?  The conflict is raging in Haiti.  How 
long have you been searching? 
 
Charles: Oh, three years.  I have not heard from him for three years.  I 
wonder everyday if I should wake up and come to this office to search 
more.  I wonder if he is alive.  But I am a father, how can I give up? 
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Introduction: Contextualizing the Safe Third Country Agreement 
Stretching over 4,000 miles of land, the U.S./Canadian border is the 
longest undefended border in the world.  According to the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), “among its many challenging natural features 
are vast mountain ranges such as the Rockies, the Great Lakes, many 
different river systems, and in the winter heavy snow and bitter cold 
temperatures” (2).   Two sovereign states with different political cultures 
and understandings of sovereignty are working together to regulate the 
border.   
 The U.S./Canadian border is in the process of being renegotiated 
as a result of larger processes of redefining and reimagining sovereign 
territories in North America.  New understandings of U.S. and Canadian 
state sovereignty are creating a conflated “other” of cross-border flows, an 
illegitimate migrant figure who is securitized, criminalized and 
disembodied (Bigo).  The contemporary “othering” of the migrant has 
serious human rights implications such as the restriction of access for 
asylum seekers in need of refugee protection.   
STCA is one policy that animates this renegotiation of sovereignty 
by regulating the flow of asylum seekers through assertions of sovereign 
power at the U.S./Canadian land border.  On paper, STCA claims to 
enhance refugee protection and to increase security in the U.S. and 
Canada.  In practice, STCA functions as a barrier and a deterrent for 
persons seeking asylum in the U.S. or Canada.  As a result, STCA 
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encourages asylum seekers to utilize informal channels to move across 
the U.S./Canadian border (such as smuggling and trafficking) which 
potentially decreases the security of individual asylum seekers and the 
national security of the U.S. and Canada. 
STCA is a piece of the Smart Border Accord (SBA), a bilateral 
agreement between the U.S. and Canada that was signed in December 
2001.  The goals of SBA are to increase security and efficiency of 
movement of cargo and people along the U.S./Canadian border.  The 
coupling of STCA and SBA is illogical; STCA focuses on refugee 
protection and SBA focuses on national security issues.  The odd couple 
formed when the U.S. and Canadian governments bargained their 
agendas during the post 9/11 political environment that favored policy 
making in the name of security.  The U.S. entered into the bilateral 
agreement of STCA with Canada which served Canada’s agenda of 
asylum flow reduction.  In return, the U.S. received Canada’s cooperation 
in border regulation through their signing onto the SBA.     
The Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) was signed by the U.S. 
and Canada in December of 2004.  STCA distributes asylum flows 
between the U.S. and Canada by requiring asylum seekers to make 
claims in their first countries of arrival, before crossing the border.  For 
example, an asylum seeker succeeds in reaching the U.S. through 
informal channels but plans to travel to Canada in order to claim asylum 
will be screened and interviewed at the U.S./Canadian border and 
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required to make a claim through the U.S. asylum system.  Essentially, 
STCA diverts flows of asylum seekers at the U.S./Canadian land border 
back to the asylum seeker’s country of “last presence”, the first “safe third” 
country encountered.   
Until STCA, asylum seekers who reached the U.S./Canadian land 
border had the opportunity to claim asylum in either the U.S. or Canada.  
Although the asylum seeker will be processed by either the U.S. or the 
Canadian systems under the policy, STCA does not allow asylum seekers 
to choose their country of asylum, a right that asylum seekers had enjoyed 
prior to STCA’s implementation.  In 2001, over half of the asylum seekers 
who made claims in Canada first traveled through the U.S.   
It is important to clarify that STCA only applies to land points of 
entry (POEs).  STCA is enacted at the U.S./Canadian land border but 
does not apply to points of entry such as water ports or airports.  If an 
asylum seeker flies from the U.S. to Canada by airplane makes an asylum 
claim in Canada, the conditions of STCA would not force her to return to 
the U.S.   
In November 2006, the U.S. Government, the Government of 
Canada and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees released a 
tripartite report, A Partnership for Protection, which evaluated the 
implementation of STCA and the policy’s impact.  The introduction of this 
report offers insight into origins of safe third as a concept and explains the 
regions that safe third country agreements were first implemented.   
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International cooperation based on the principle of responsibility sharing 
provides a basis for states to respond to these challenges, in part by providing for 
the more orderly handling of refugee applications. To this end, developed 
countries, including Canada and the U.S., have articulated a “Safe Third Country” 
policy. The premise of this policy is that where a refugee claimant could have 
previously sought protection in another safe country, it is reasonable and 
appropriate to require the refugee claimant to return and make use of that 
opportunity. (Partnership, Introduction) 
 
 Safe Third policies are founded on interpretations of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol by 
states that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first “safe” country 
they arrive in (UNHCR).  Asylum seekers who pass through multiple “safe” 
countries or apply for asylum in multiple countries are considered to be 
“asylum shoppers”, a phrase commonly used by the U.S. and Canadian 
governments to refer to asylum seekers.  The excerpt below from the 
Partnership introduction demonstrates that the safe third concept was 
developed and implemented for the purpose of distributing asylum flow 
processing, referred to above as “responsibility sharing”.   
The European experience illustrates similar cooperation through responsibility-
sharing efforts. Several European states, also faced with the serious challenges 
described above, began to introduce the Safe Third Country concept into their 
national legislation during the 1980s, including Switzerland (1979), Belgium 
(1980) and Sweden (1989). In 1990, European Union states built on the original 
1985 Schengen Agreement (related to the harmonization of border and visa 
controls) first by amending Schengen to include criteria by which to assign 
responsibility for adjudicating asylum applications to one—but only one —
participating state. The Dublin Convention, signed in Dublin, Ireland, on 
June 15, 1990, replaced these Schengen provisions. The Dublin Convention built 
on previous experience with use of the Safe Third Country concept in national 
legislation to establish a multilateral framework of criteria to determine which 
European Union member state would be responsible for adjudicating an asylum 
claim, and required that state to accept the return of asylum seekers who had 
moved to another member state and sought protection. Its underlying premise 
was that all member states of the European Union could be considered as safe 
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third countries for the purposes of responsibility and burden sharing with respect 
to refugee claims.  (Partnership, Introduction) 
 
  
In the discussion of safe third in the EU, the Schengen and Dublin 
policies are often evoked.  As described above, asylum seeker flows are 
distributed across member states of the EU that are deemed “safe” for 
asylum processing.  The U.S./Canadian STCA is based on the European 
concept of safe third but differs from the EU practice of safe third because 
it is a bilateral agreement between two countries that are deemed “safe”: 
the U.S. and Canada.  It is outside the scope of this project to conduct an 
in-depth analysis of the interpretation and application of “safe third 
country” in the domestic laws of EU member states and the U.S. and 
Canada; however these analyses would be necessary for a 
comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of safe third country agreements 
across the world.   
Through this thesis, I offer an evaluation of the role of STCA in 
shaping the U.S./Canadian border.  I offer three analytical readings of the 
policy: a literature analysis, a policy analysis and an analysis of interviews 
with persons involved with STCA’s development and implementation.   
 In Chapter 1, I review literature relevant to the current debates 
surrounding borders, sovereignty and refugee protection.  I place STCA 
within broader global and regional trends of asylum.   
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of STCA as presented in official 
policy documents, press releases, speeches and news articles.  Please 
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refer to Appendix 1 for the final text of STCA.  I aim to demonstrate how 
the U.S. and Canadian governments wished STCA to be interpreted by 
their respective publics.   
 In Chapter 3, I discuss my findings which draw on interviews with 
more than 20 key informants from the government, the non-profit and 
academic sectors in both Canada and the U.S.: Ottawa, Montreal, 
Toronto, and Washington, DC.  The goal of this field work was to 
understand the motivations for the formation and signing of STCA while 
evaluating the actual implementation process of the policy on both sides of 
the border.  I explore the difference between the official aims of STCA laid 
out in Chapter 2 and the actual function of the policy as interpreted by 
those who work on the many dimensions of STCA such as the policy’s 
implementation and those who work with asylum seekers impacted by the 
policy.    
 In the concluding chapter I summarize findings and the various 
perspectives surrounding the formation, implementation and future of 
STCA.   
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Chapter 1: (re)defining the post 9/11 border 
This chapter presents current trends in international refugee 
protection and defines new understandings of the border and sovereignty.  
I will place STCA in the context of broader changes and argue that STCA 
is one control mechanism in a large group of policies that aim to regulate 
and reduce asylum flows (Hyndman and Mountz).  Through the 
application of STCA, the border between the U.S. and Canada has 
become more of an obstacle and a deterrent to the asylum seeker 
attempting to realize her asylum journey.  The space of the border is a 
battleground of STCA, where the geographical struggles of the asylum 
seeker play out.  Asylum seekers no longer can move between the U.S. 
and Canada to make asylum claims in their country of choice which has 
resulted in lower levels of protection and, in some cases, a denial of 
protection for asylum seekers.   I will discuss this claim further in chapter 
two.  First, I will analyze the trends in asylum regulation that are eroding 
refugee protection in North America and will locate STCA among these 
processes.   
The review that follows is inherently incomplete since it provides a 
snapshot of a continually changing border.  The border is not only a line 
on a map; it is a dynamic process.  Additionally, I will discuss themes that 
emerged during my field work that were not laid out in the literature.   
 
The U.S./Canadian border steals the spotlight 
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 Many authors such as Hristoulas, Andreas, Koslowski and Salter, 
discussed the increase in attention placed on the U.S./Canadian border 
following the events of 9/11, a manifestation of Canada being perceived 
as a security threat to the U.S.  It is important to note that Canada’s 
refugee and immigration systems were perceived as “lenient” and were 
cited as a major source of insecurity to the U.S.  Hristoulas describes how 
the “U.S. media has portrayed Canada as a hotbed for terrorist activity. 
Special emphasis has been placed on Canada’s refugee laws…” (30). 
Continuing Hristoulas’ discussion of post 9/11 threat perceptions, Andreas 
presents a shift in U.S./Canadian border relations that occurred after 9/11: 
 
The openness of the border, labeled ‘the world’s longest undefended border,’ has 
traditionally been a source of mutual pride, but is now perceived and treated as a 
source of vulnerability by the United States.  Even though none of the 19 
hijackers involved in the September 11th attacks entered across the border and in 
fact had been issued visas by the United States, some U.S. media reports have 
depicted Canada as a haven for terrorists who exploit Canada’s liberal refugee 
and immigration system. (6) 
 
Canadian border enforcement, or the lack of border enforcement, 
was interpreted by the U.S. as a threat to security in the post 9/11 era.  
Koslowski explains that Canada was perceived as a “sieve through which 
terrorists could easily pass” after the events of 9/11 (2).  The increased 
attention on the threat posed by the U.S./Canadian border’s lack of 
enforcement logically encouraged the development of restrictive border 
policies.  However, the U.S. and Canadian states did not wish to tighten 
the border through measures that would be destructive to their lucrative 
economic relationship as top trading partners.   
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Salter articulates the paradox discussed by many of the authors: 
the need to facilitate trade between the U.S. and Canada while restricting 
movement as a security precaution.  “At different times since the 9/11 
attacks, the U.S.-Canadian border has been variously represented as a 
leaky backdoor into America and as a necessary trade link” (Salter, 
Passports 82). The border cannot be closed because the trade 
relationship between the U.S. and Canada is essential to the survival of 
both economies.  The U.S. is Canada’s number one trading partner and 
Canada serves as the second largest importer of American goods.   
Andreas describes the importance of the economic relationship 
between the U.S. and Canada.  As of 2003, “The United States and 
Canada conduct $1.3 billion worth of two-way trade a day, most of which 
is moved by truck across the border.  Forty-thousand commercial 
shipments and 300,000 people cross the 4,000-mile-long U.S.-Canada 
border every day” (Andreas 7).   
The struggle for openness and restrictiveness plays out at the 
border.  Andreas presents the contradictory desires of the liberal nation-
state: the desire to keep the border “open for business” and closed to 
security threats, explaining that during the NAFTA era, “the border had 
become both more blurred and more sharply demarcated than ever 
before” (3).  The U.S. and Canadian states wish to facilitate economic 
flows while preventing flows that may threaten the state such as the 
movements of terrorists.   
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In order to develop border policies that respond to these seemingly 
contradictory demands, the U.S. and Canadian governments are 
attempting to strike a balance (perhaps an unattainable goal) between free 
movement for economic benefit and restricted movement in the name of 
security.  The struggle persists.   
 
Renegotiating the U.S./Canadian border post 9/11 
 In order to satisfy demands for openness to trade and heightened 
security, the border is being renegotiated.  Since the U.S./Canadian 
border is under the microscope of government and media scrutiny, how is 
the border changing?  Through my study of literature on emerging border 
trends, primary and secondary sources, I have learned that this line on the 
map is undergoing a makeover, a process that will not likely be completed 
for years to come, if at all.  Therefore, it is important to study the border in 
order to analyze what is happening as it is happening, in the hopes of 
influencing outcomes and shaping the new look of the border. 
Pauly proposes the ideal border that would balance trade and 
security, “to reconstruct a physical and psychological border with the 
United States, one that would keep out as many problems as possible, 
while still allowing in as many opportunities as Canadians agreed were 
attractive.  Neither high barriers nor open bridges would do.  The new 
border had to be marked by a unique kind of fence.” (93)   
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While there is a literary consensus over the fact that the border is 
undergoing a facelift, there are contradictory descriptions of the “new” 
border, what the “unique fence” would look like.  How are the struggles of 
openness and restrictiveness constructing or deconstructing the border?  I 
argue that the post 9/11 border triages flows into two groupings: desired 
and undesired.  The U.S. and Canadian states execute the deflection and 
facilitation through the blurring of regimes associated with the border and 
through the literal act of moving the border.   
Andreas offers a look at the renegotiation process occurring in the 
U.S./Canadian and U.S./Mexican borders. 
 
…borders are very much back in style.  Rather than simply being dismantled in 
the face of intensifying pressures of economic integration, border controls are 
being re-tooled and redesigned as part of a new and expanding ‘war on 
terrorism’…Traditional border issues such as trade and migration are now 
inescapably evaluated through a security lens. (1)   
 
Andreas’ border supports my argument of the blurring of categories at the 
border, a border that triages flows on the basis of security into those who 
are legal and those who are illegal.  The conflation of all border uses into 
security considerations diverts focus away from the important 
considerations of human security and refugee protection.   
In addition to the trend of “blurring” categories of cross-border flows 
(Bigo), many authors discussed the trend of states moving the border 
away from its traditional location through the processes of 
transnationalizing, externalizing (Guiraudon and Joppke), borders existing 
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elsewhere (Zureik and Salter), pushing the borders out (Flynn), and 
delocalizing (Salter), in order to address security concerns.  New 
understandings of U.S. and Canadian sovereignty are redefining the 
territorial limits of North America as a region.  States are manipulating the 
border by moving it away from the line on the map; to regulate flows 
before they reach the border.  Borders now occur anywhere the state 
deems to be a border site.  Zureik and Salter discuss the manipulation of 
traditional definitions of sovereign territory: 
 
The borders of the state need no longer be confined to traditional points of entry 
which travelers, citizens, immigrants and other transient groups are accustomed 
to pass through- legally or illegally.  Borders now exist elsewhere, so to speak, in 
places that traditionally belonged to sovereign states, but now have been 
transformed to enable governments to check across their geographic borders 
personal identity and monitor the movement of people before such movement 
actually takes place. (9)  
 
STCA does not fall under these processes of moving the border.  
However, STCA functions as a deterrent and part of the fortification of 
U.S./Canadian boundaries.  The above trends strengthen and restrict 
entrance to the U.S. and Canada away from the land border where STCA 
functions.  These various points of fortification are related in that they 
deter and at times exclude asylum seekers from reaching the U.S. or 
Canada.  Outside of the practical functions of these processes, the 
deployment of tactics to strengthen and move borders gives context to the 
goals of the U.S. and Canadian states to reduce flows of unwanted 
migrants, a category of potential security threats that asylum seekers are 
often placed under by nation-states.  Under STCA, the asylum seekers 
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who reach the U.S. and Canadian land border will have the opportunity to 
go through asylum processing in one of the countries.  These trends serve 
to probe a broader agenda of exclusion that prevents or deters asylum 
seekers from traveling to North America, thus not interacting with STCA at 
all.   
Mirroring Flynn’s argument of pushing borders out, Salter notes that 
one policy initiative of the U.S. is “a distancing of the discriminating and 
policing function away from the actual site of the international border” 
(Salter, Passports 75).  Salter argues that “the border is not just a line, but 
a network of POEs that accommodate the global transportation grid.  It is 
better to speak of the ‘border function’ than of lines in the sand” (Salter, 
Passports 80).  While STCA functions as a deterrent to asylum seekers in 
North America and in their home or host countries away from the region, 
asylum seekers may be deterred by interactions with the U.S. and 
Canadian states in various points across the globe (Mountz).  How is the 
moving the location of the border away from the traditional border site 
serving the U.S. and Canadian states?  By processing people away from 
sovereign territory, states can stem the undesired flows or facilitate the 
movement of persons who are desired.  When reviewed in the context of 
STCA, these trends offer new research directions on how many persons 
are not reaching North America to make claims because they are deterred 
or prevented from traveling.   
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Hristoulas describes how continental and border security is being 
redefined, “rethinking how borders are conceived…Canada, Mexico, and 
the United States law enforcement agencies would work more closely 
together away from the physical frontiers to reduce the need for inspection 
at the borders themselves” (32).  Guiraudon and Joppke discuss the 
“externalizing” of border controls in order to prevent migration (13).  They 
cleverly refer to these multi-site control tactics as “remote control” (14).  
States assert power over migratory flows at multiple sites and on multiple 
scales around the globe.  Now, more than ever, the border is being 
renegotiated to exist away from its line on the map.  While it is difficult to 
measure how many potential refugees are deterred or prevented from 
reaching North America, I believe it is imperative to question the extent of 
the reduction of access to North America in relation to STCA.  The policy 
of STCA redistributes flows between the U.S. and Canada but why are the 
overall numbers of asylum seekers in North America decreasing?  Some 
may be deterred by STCA while others are may be deterred by these 
globalized policing practices of the U.S. and Canadian states.   
 
Sovereignty and mobile bodies 
Since the renegotiating of the border is a manifestation of the 
reimaginings of state sovereignty by the U.S. and Canadian state actors, it 
is important to pick up where Scott left off in his project, calling for the 
investigation of “why the state has always seemed to be the enemy of 
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‘people who move around’” (1).  How are assertions of sovereign power 
over persons on the move serving the state?  Regulation of movement is 
essential to the sovereign identity of the state (Nyers).  As the state aims 
to protect those within its borders, the state securitizes and criminalizes 
migration as a means of controlling those who attempt to enter or may 
attempt to enter the state territory.   
STCA is a policy that sweepingly criminalizes and securitizes 
asylum seekers.  As discussed in the introductory chapter, the safe third 
country agreements were first implemented in Europe to prevent “asylum 
shopping”, the act of asylum seekers passing through multiple countries 
which are considered to be “safe” countries to make asylum claims or 
asylum seekers making claims in multiple countries.  While this act of 
“asylum shopping” is employed by many asylum seekers as a means to 
obtain the highest level of protection or in some cases, as a survival 
strategy, the U.S. and Canadian states view the exercise as an abuse by 
non bona fide refugees to their asylum processing systems.  STCA returns 
asylum seekers to the first country in North America the asylum seeker 
passed through, preventing asylum seekers from accessing the system 
that may be in their best interests of protection.   
 Bigo describes the securitization of immigration as a way for the 
state to exercise sovereignty.  Bigo presents Scott’s “seeing like a state”, 
the ways the state views itself and others. “Securitization of the immigrant 
as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container 
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for the polity.  It is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their 
symbolic control over territorial boundaries” (Bigo, Unease 65).  The state 
defines itself at territorial limits through the regulation of migrant bodies.   
Similarly, Hyndman and Mountz present the perspective of states, “asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants embody insecurity by testing the 
porosity of political borders” (80). The state forces the migrant to embody 
insecurity by disembodying the migrant of its natural representation of 
human rights, democracy, and humanitarianism.  Asylum seekers and 
refugees traverse to the U.S. and Canada to escape persecution and to 
enjoy the protection offered by these democratic states. The state views 
the mobile migrant body as a security threat.  Salter discuss the mobile 
body as being, “…regarded in the same light as a criminal or as a victim of 
an epidemic: his mere physical presence increases the risk of violence’” 
(Salter, Threshold 38). 
In particular, asylum seekers embody insecurity because they are 
viewed by states as illegally mobile bodies.  Asylum seekers who pass 
through multiple “safe” countries are criminalized by the STCA, since they 
are forced to return to their last safe country of presence.  Walters offers 
another perspective on the relationship between security and movement: 
“Insecurity is bound up with themes of mobility: it is the movement, the 
circulation, the presence of unauthorized bodies which have violated the 
borders of the nation-state” (Walters, Domopolitics 247).   Crosby 
discusses this criminalization of the asylum seeker: “The expression 
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‘forum shopping’ connotes the idea that choosing the country of asylum is 
essentially an opportunistic abuse of the international regime of refugee 
protection.” (6)  In theory, STCA attempts to eliminate the “abuse” of 
asylum seekers exercising a preference in their protection. In practice, the 
U.S. and Canadian governments currently have no method for measuring 
how STCA is achieving this aim.   
States securitize and criminalize the mobile body as a means to 
reinforce their sovereignty.  Through STCA, the U.S. and Canadian states 
usurp the ability of asylum seekers to exercise their agency at the U.S. 
and Canadian land border.  Nyers illustrates the relationship between 
state sovereignty and asylum seekers by describing the use of the 
‘foreigner’ as a means to execute a “national (re)founding” (1076).  
“Whenever a state ponders whether or not to grant asylum to an 
individual, it is making an intervention in the politics of protection.  This is a 
significant political issue because the capacity to decide upon matters of 
inclusion and exclusion is a key element of sovereign power” (1071).  
In what ways is sovereign power asserted over the mobile body?  
States exercise sovereign control over migration flows through the 
manipulation of geography.  International refugee law does not provide 
asylum seekers with a defined right to enter a country to claim asylum but 
does grant the right to seek asylum.  Penz presents the restricted rights of 
asylum seekers:   
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One such right is a right to asylum, in the form of a prohibition of the forced return 
of those who have reached foreign territory and can claim individual persecution 
(non-refoulement).  It is a limited right, because it does not include a clear right to 
entry and does not apply to other forms of victimization, such as by general 
rather than specifically targeted violence. (46)   
 
States exploit the geographies of asylum by intercepting asylum 
flows outside of sovereignty territory making it difficult for asylum seekers 
to claim asylum (Hyndman and Mountz).  The international refugee 
protection regime has yet to define and monitor obligations for states 
performing interdiction and deflection away from their traditional territorial 
limits.  What rights do asylum seekers have in the grey zones of state 
control?  Nyers discusses the “mezzanine spaces of sovereignty – that is, 
those spaces which are in-between the inside and the outside of the state” 
(1080).  Territory is deemed by the sovereign state to be non-sovereign 
territory for its benefit.  Hyndman and Mountz explain that “the refugee 
crisis moves into sovereign territory, which in turn is converted to non-
sovereign territory” (85).   
As long as the denial of access to asylum occurs away from the 
sovereign territory, states are able to mask their dwindling support for the 
institution of asylum.  On paper, states have committed to international 
and domestic agreements that acknowledge the humanitarian need for 
refugee protection.  However, in practice, states are reducing access to 
the protection that can be a matter of life or death for the asylum seeker.  
Gibney summarizes the contradictions surrounding the institution of 
asylum: “A kind of schizophrenia seems to pervade Western responses to 
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asylum seekers and refugees; great importance is attached to the 
principle of asylum but enormous efforts are made to ensure that refugees 
(and others with less pressing claims) never reach the territory of the state 
where they could receive its protection” (2).  Regardless of the high value 
placed on asylum by states, in practice, Western states are reducing 
access to refugee protection.   
 STCA serves to close off Canada or the U.S. to the asylum seeker 
coming from the other side.  By closing off regions of sovereign territory 
and interacting with flows before they touch sovereign soil, states are 
reinforcing their sovereign identities.  According to Hyndman and Mountz: 
“The North American Safe Third Country Agreement represents a different 
architecture of enmity, a fortification to exclude the dangerous other 
whose exclusion fortifies sovereignty of the states involved” (90).  
Sovereignty is “fortified” through the exclusion of whom?   
 
Reconfiguring the migrant “other” 
 How are new imaginations of sovereignty reconfiguring the 
undesired cross-border flow, the migrant “other”?  What does the “other” 
of the border look like?  The securitization and criminalization blurs the 
“other” into a homogenous threat to state security (Bigo).  The blurring of 
the “other” disembodies distinct migrants who were the asylum seeker, the 
economic migrant, the terrorist, the criminal, the smuggler and the 
trafficker into an undefined person on the move who threatens the state.  
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Those seeking asylum at the U.S./Canadian border are first securitized 
under the “migrant” category and then criminalized as “asylum shoppers” 
when they are identified as asylum seekers.   
The nation-state asserts its sovereignty over the “other” and 
manipulates the visibility of the “other’s” figure in order to reinforce 
sovereignty and justify state policies.  Bigo defines the new “other” of the 
contemporary border.  Bigo describes the “immigrant” as the foreign being 
that is invading the “body” of the state. (Bigo, Unease 67)  Bigo explains 
the utility of the word “immigrant” by describing its broad and 
heterogeneous meaning.  “Immigrant” can encompass any person or 
population that the state desires to present as a security risk. Bigo’s 
analysis of the use of the broad category of “immigrant” by the state 
supports my argument that the categories of the undesired migrant are 
blurring into one because it is more useful for the state to have an 
undefined enemy, thus applicable to all who are illegally en route.   
The all encompassing “immigrant” of Bigo is highlighted by 
Hyndman and Mountz who discuss the “….increasingly blurred distinction 
among suspected criminals, terrorists, and refugee claimants.  Since 9/11, 
but starting well before, migrants have come to stand in for all that 
threatens state security and welfare…” (78).  The aim to reduce “abuses” 
in the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems through STCA shifts the focus 
from the human rights needs of the asylum seeker to the presumed 
security threat and illegality of the asylum seekers’ movement.   
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 The undesired “immigrant” is held up against the desired migrant 
who moves for purposes that are interpreted as beneficial to the states.  
The U.S. and Canadian states aim to facilitate cross-border flows of 
persons who are formally employed in the U.S. and Canada and to 
encourage tourism in North America.  Crosby lists these binaries of 
desired and undesired flows: such as “illegal/legal, 
documented/undocumented, political/economic” (3).  STCA contributes to 
the formation of these binaries, pitting refugee agency against the agency 
of the state by forcefully redirecting flows of asylum seekers who would 
“abuse” the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems by exercising a 
preference.   
I return to Nyers who discusses the types of migrants that are 
discriminated against and cast as undesired by the states:  
 
Asylum seekers, refugees, non-status residents, undocumented workers, so-
called ‘over-stayers’ and ‘illegals’ – together, they have come to constitute a kind 
of ‘abject class’ of global migrants.  Whatever their designation, these migrants 
are increasingly cast as the objects of securitized fears and anxieties, possessing 
either an unsavoury agency (ie they are identity-frauds, queue jumpers, people 
who undermine consent in the polity) or a dangerous agency (ie they are 
criminals, terrorists, agents of insecurity). (1070)   
 
The reconfiguration process of the undesired migrant is creating a 
Nyers’ “abject class” of cross-border flows.  The migration policies of the 
European Union such as the Schengen Agreement triage flows into 
desired and undesired just as the U.S./Canadian border is now executing.  
The danger of policies such as STCA is that asylum seekers are 
perceived as threats before they are recognized as those in need of 
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protection.  Walters discusses the “others” of the Schengen border, 
discussing the transnational “threats” of people who move and how they 
are perceived as homogenously dangerous:  
 
A security field has been assembled through elite and public discourse which 
brings together crime, drugs, asylum seekers, human smugglers, terrorists, and 
so on, as though their association were quite natural.  …This association of 
refugees with crime, drugs, and terrorism, and their distancing from discourses of 
democracy, human security, and human rights have been powerfully contested 
by domestic and international groups such as Amnesty International and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (Walters, Mapping 570)   
 
Migrants who once represented multiple motivations for movement such 
as economic need, the need for asylum protection or for personal reasons 
(or a mixture of all), are conflated into a singular “other” who embodies 
insecurity.   Under STCA, asylum seekers are placed in the “other” 
category and many remain there unless their asylum claims are accepted 
by the U.S. or Canada.   
Some bureaucrats themselves view the migrant “other” as having 
one face, one category, or as Heyman writes, “a one-dimensional other” 
(268).  In an interview with one of the directors of an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) district, Heyman described this person’s view 
of the migrant as “aliens appeared as an anonymous liquid flow that 
constantly threatened to seep through holes in INS dikes and pour into the 
interior of the United States” (268).  The training of U.S. and Canadian 
border agents is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is an area of 
investigation relevant to understanding the domination of security 
responses to cross-border flows.   
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Why are the disembodiment and the homogenization of the 
undesired migrant convenient to the state?  An undefined migrant “other” 
allows states to have broad, uniform border policies that do not require the 
resources and training to separate the terrorist from the asylum seeker. 
The state can more readily deny access if the person without papers at 
the border is a presupposed security threat before considering the 
possibility of the person needing asylum.  Some potential asylum seekers 
may be removed because they do not or are not identified as asylum 
seekers because of profiling by border patrol, language barriers or cultural 
issues.  The U.S. and Canadian states are looking through a security lens 
which is making it difficult for them to see asylum seekers.   
Walters speaks to the convenience of an undefined “other” and the 
state desires of simplicity:   
 
Never mind this complex interrelation of the political and the economic in the 
production of exodus.  Nor that the decision to pack one’s bags and move 
thousands of miles facing all sorts of life-threatening risks in the process is never 
made lightly.  If this complex reality doesn’t fit our moral categories, we’ll make it.  
We’ll filter the white noise of multiple mobilities and establish clear ‘routes’ and 
‘channels’.  If we can just identify the genuine refugee, or the high-skilled 
migrant, this will allow us to deal with the others, the ‘bogus’ with greater 
confidence from the public and thus with more firmness.  Just as with the old 
poor law, we’ll send the undeserving and the illegitimate on their way.  The 
difference is the next parish is no longer just down the road.  Instead, it’s a 
specially-chartered plane-trip to the nearest applicable ‘safe third country’ or 
most recent ‘country of transit’. (Walters Domopolotics 249)   
 
The simplicity of ‘us’ and ‘them’ creates two groups: the desired 
flows and the dangerous flows.  STCA is a policy that reinforces this 
binary by employing a simplistic triage approach.  The simplification, 
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homogenization and blurring of the migrant “other” has serious human 
rights and protection implications such as mistreatment and denial of 
access.   
 
Manipulating the (in)visibility of the migrant “other” 
 What measures are employed to control the migrant “other” 
through STCA?  STCA reduces the visibility of the asylum seeker by 
discouraging formal border movements; those who go or remain 
“underground” are less visible.  Simultaneously, STCA gives the image of 
false security by executing high-profile crackdowns.  These moments of 
insecurity are used to justify policies that heighten border enforcement 
(Nevins).  This method achieves two goals: to discourage flows before 
they happen and to give an impression of national security.  Essentially, 
the figure of the migrant “other” is manipulated and deployed by states in 
order to serve state agendas of security and exclusion (Mountz).     
For example, Colombian refugees and Ecuadoran migrants whom I 
worked with in an Ecuadorian migrant assistance office asked me if they 
would be able to reach Canada with the new border policy, STCA.  The 
policy was viewed by potential migrants and asylum seekers, in Ecuador, 
as a barrier, serving as a deterrent.  Border regulation produces visible 
events such as high-profile crackdowns that make the image of the border 
appear safe and efficiently managed, placebos of security.  However, 
border regulation does not increase the security of the border environment 
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by default.  Regulation pushes border flows outside of the public eye, 
making informal cross border activities invisible in order to offer a false 
image of security.     
STCA serves to manipulate the visibility of the migrant in order to 
give images of insecurity and security at the border that will advance U.S. 
and Canadian policies.  I agree with Andreas that heightening border 
regulation increases illegal movements and pushes these movements out 
of visibility.  The border appears to be more secure because the increase 
in illegal activity becomes invisible.  Andreas presents the success of the 
“high visibility” border campaigns in making the border appear to be more 
secure or “more under control” by explaining that  “Illegal crossers were 
pushed out of sight (into more remote deserts and mountains) and 
therefore out of the media spotlight and the public’s mind” (5). 
Bigo discusses the “refusal” of the state to “accept that immigration 
is now out of their control generates an inflation of coercive discourse that 
masks the fact that they are playing more with symbols than with effective 
measures” (Bigo, Migration 125).  Border control offers symbolic 
representations of security to mask the increasing insecurity of the border. 
Those excluded by border policies become invisible.  Hyndman and 
Mountz build on their discussion of the disembodied migrant figure as a 
security threat by offering the increasing invisibility of the “refugee” 
through the employment of “states of exception”, “making it possible to 
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disembody ‘the refugee’ in public discourse and, in corresponding fashion, 
to erase the refugee from the immigrant-receiving Western state” (86).   
The decreasing visibility of the asylum seeker under STCA has 
human rights implications such as asylum seekers being abused by 
smugglers and traffickers, services utilized since legal channels to move 
between the U.S. and Canada are eliminated by STCA.  STCA gives the 
false image of security for asylum seekers in the U.S (Nadig, Koser). and 
Canada.  However, those remaining undocumented and becoming less 
visible may not receive the protection they need.  Crosby calls for 
increasing the visibility of the invisibles of containment: “We need to move 
away from a triage approach and instead embrace a construct that allows 
us to make visible and include all those who are affected and made 
vulnerable by containment policies” (11).  There is a perpetual struggle 
between the state and migrant of visibility, as migrants exercise their 
agency.  Nyers explained that migrants execute “sovereign (re)takings” by 
making themselves visible in a system that wants them to be invisible 
(1086).  States and migrants are fighting blow for blow over inclusion and 
exclusion. 
The increase in attention on the U.S./Canadian border has distorted 
the realities of “safety” and “security” of the border.  By making border 
enforcement policies such as STCA more visible, STCA makes cross-
border movements less visible, deterring and discouraging formal 
movements of asylum seekers.  Zureik and Salter argue that  “there has 
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been no deep structural change to the process of crossing borders since 
the terror attacks of 9/11, but the amount of public attention and policy 
scrutiny has increased” (48).  I contend that there have been significant 
changes to the border during the post 9/11 era.  The events of 9/11 set in 
motion a number of policies that had incubated for years prior.  These 
policies are reconfiguring and restructuring the border.  Both the policies 
and the image of safety constructed by the states are destructive to the 
interests of those migrating and those within the U.S. and Canada.  STCA 
threatens the security of the asylum seeker and of the U.S. and Canadian 
states.  There is no evidence that STCA is increasing security.  There is 
less protection offered and an increasingly insecure environment created 
by the policies and manipulations of visibility.  
 
Europeanizing North American control 
Outside of North America, there are models of these regulatory 
practices of the migrant.  There is much to be learned about the 
renegotiations of borders in North America by reviewing the renegotiations 
occurring in Europe.  The EU served first as an incubator and second as a 
model for North American migration policies.  Many authors have 
discussed an “Europeanization” of the U.S./Canadian border and North 
American migration control strategies including, Guiraudon and Joppke, 
Andreas, Walters, Abell, and Clarkson, as being part of a broad agenda of 
containment among Western states.   
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 Guiraudon and Joppke note that “the containment of illegal 
immigration has quickly moved to the top of Western states’ immigration 
control agenda, and it provides the main impetus to the 
supranationalization of immigration policy in the European Union…” (7). 
Canada and the U.S. are attempting to define a security perimeter that 
closes their combined territories off to undesired migration.  This 
supranationalization process is modeled after the EU, when states joined 
together to open their borders internally to trade and to deflect flows at the 
external borders of Europe as a region.  In his section on “Future Border 
Trajectories”, Andreas describes North America  
 
…multilateral policy harmonization and a ‘pooling’ of sovereignty to build a formal 
North American security perimeter (a ‘fortress North America’).  Such a path 
would represent a Europeanization of border controls and thus a qualitative 
transformation of the continental integration project. (12)   
  
Walters discusses the purpose of the EU perimeter, formed by the 
Schengen Agreement, “…Schengen does not appear to be connected 
with a politics of war and peace, of geographical territory understood as a 
power resource” (Walters, Mapping 562).  Power for what purpose?  
Power to exclude persons on the move?   
 One question that emerged from my review of the literature 
surrounding Europeanization was: how does the ideal model of migration 
control uphold or undermine international refugee protection?  To what 
standards is harmonization adhering to or aiming for?   Which state 
practices are considered to be best and exemplary? Abell calls for Canada 
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to put pressure on the United States to prevent a harmonization process 
that would not result in the “lowest common denominator’ for Canada, but 
in higher standards for the United States” (587). 
Contrasting the U.S. government and media opinions, Clarkson 
presents the Canadian system as being “safer” than the U.S. immigration 
system: “Full policy harmonization would also weaken Canadian refugee 
and immigration procedures that had proved more effective at monitoring 
terrorist s than had those of their American counterparts” (78). Clarkson 
cites a quote from his interview with Janet Dench who deems the 
“exporting U.S. practices and North-Americanizing the insecurity that 
characterized American society” as dangerous to Canada (78).   
Common practices and harmonization can decrease the quality of 
protection by executing a “race to the bottom” of refugee protection.  The 
pressures circulated between the EU states, the U.S. and Canada 
encourage policies of exclusion that make these territorial regions less 
accessible and less appealing to potential refugees in search of safe 
haven.   
Abell presents the refugee protection gaps that have resulted from 
EU safe third country provisions:  
 
…the EU system has resulted in the ‘lowest common denominator’ in that each 
EU country is trying to be more strict than its neighbor.  If conditions in one EU 
member state are not favorable for asylum seekers, there is the belief they will try 
to reach another EU member state instead where they will probably be 
recognized as refugees, leading to a higher number of asylum applications for 
that same country.  This thinking has resulted in stricter refugee procedures in all 
of the member countries of the European Union. (588) 
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The U.S./Canadian STCA can be expected to exclude refugees in 
similar ways to the EU STCA, given that the EU was the model for North 
America.  The signing of STCA can be contextualized within this trend of 
Europeanization.  Abell discusses how Canada followed the EU model.  
Not only did Canada follow the EU model, Canada felt pressure from the 
EU to implement a Safe Third policy, and then pressured the U.S. to sign.  
Abell argues that “Canada has not been immune to the developments in 
the European Union, and its immigration policies towards refugee 
determination have changed accordingly” (570).  Since Western states 
harbor a fear of being overrun with by masses of asylum seekers, the 
states aim for high levels of exclusion in order to look less appealing to 
asylum seekers.   
Abell describes the pressure experienced by the Canadian state:  
 
…there was a belief that Canada’s fair and open determination system would not 
be able to cope with the pressures generated by the diminution of asylum 
opportunities in Europe.  Canada was seen as having no choice then but to 
adopt similar protectionist policies to the ones in place in the European Union… 
(576) 
 
States recognize the value of geography and are aware that asylum 
seekers use geography to respond to restrictive policies.  In order to avoid 
flows of asylum seekers transferring from one region to another, states 
cooperate with other states to tighten their common borders.  Canada is 
geographically isolated from land migration flows except for its southern 
territorial limit that is shared with the U.S.  STCA serves as a way for 
Canada to fortify its territory to reduce asylum flows.    
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STCA: deterring and denying access 
How does the literature support the argument that STCA is a 
control that achieves exclusion through geography?   Hyndman and 
Mountz propose that STCA and “…other restrictive measures designed to 
thwart the arrival of asylum seekers, conveniently exploit Canada’s 
geography to lessen the perceived burden of receiving refugees.  This 
agreement is but one of many that together fortify borders and acts of 
sovereignty through exclusion” (82). Under STCA, Canada is closed off to 
asylum seekers who attempt to reach Canadian territory via the land 
border.   
Crosby places STCA among the regulatory practices of the state:   
 
Since the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift from 
policies committed to resettlement as a permanent solution to refugee crises, as 
outlined in the Geneva Convention, to policies aimed at containing refugee 
populations in the regions where crises occur – essentially, the ‘not in my 
backyard’ syndrome.  These containment policies include strategies of diversion 
and deflection (for example, safe third country agreements and transit-processing 
zones), deterrence (detention of asylum applicants, denial of access to 
employment), and, increasingly, prevention of movement altogether. (6)   
  
STCA has advanced the agenda of the U.S. and Canadian states of 
restricting access to asylum seekers.  STCA is a policy of control and 
deterrence that is part of a broad range of policies that erode refugee 
protection in North America.  The processes of redefining and reimagining 
U.S. and Canadian sovereignties are causing migrants to struggle at 
various border battlegrounds (wherever the state deems a border) from an 
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inferior position of presumed illegality.  Some asylum seekers struggle 
with STCA at the battleground of the U.S./Canadian land border and are 
directly redistributed by the U.S. and Canadian states.  Those asylum 
seekers who do not interact directly with STCA at the U.S./Canadian land 
border may be deterred or prevented form reaching North America by 
interactions with the U.S. and Canadian states at processing points 
around the globe through mechanisms of interdiction and interception.  
Outside of direct or indirect interactions with the U.S. and Canadian 
states, asylum seekers may be deterred from traveling to North America 
due to their ideological interaction with STCA; they are discouraged from 
travel because STCA is interpreted as an obstacle to realizing their 
asylum journeys.  Nyers presented the exclusionary function of STCA.  
“These agreements act in ways that reverse the flows of established 
transnational migratory paths, turning them into transnational corridors of 
expulsion” (1070). 
Nyers, Crosby, and Hyndman and Mountz support my argument 
and concern that Safe Third rejects its official aims of enhancing refugee 
protection by serving as a policy of control as part of a broad range of 
exclusionary measures such as interdiction and interception.  These 
policies are restricting access to refugee protection in North America by 
closing off pieces of sovereign territory to asylum flows.   
 
Summarizing the post 9/11 border 
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 How do I define the post 9/11 border and sovereignty in North 
America?  Defining the new understandings of the border and sovereignty 
with 9/11 as a benchmark is useful.  It serves to contextualize the 
changing border and state in the well defined post 9/11 era, when “post 
9/11” is a phrase of powerful currency.  However, 9/11 did not initiate the 
development of new ideas for migration regulation, but set in motion 
policies that were conceived decades prior.  Ackleson describes 9/11 as a 
“focusing event” that provided the political impetus for the signing of the 
Smart Border (150).  The post 9/11 border refers to a time period more 
than an era of new ideas and projects.   
 Just as U.S. and Canadian agendas of exclusion have operated for 
years, we can expect U.S. and Canadian border policies to advance 
agendas of exclusion into the foreseeable future. Gibney summarizes a 
forecast of exclusion: “There will be no let up in the tight control currently 
exercised over asylum in the years ahead. …the events of that fateful 
September day will ensure that any future attempts to liberalise asylum 
policy are likely to founder on the rocks of preserving the security of US 
citizens” (Gibney 165).   
While the forecast of refugee protection in North America is bleak, I 
believe there is hope for a more inclusionary approach in the future.  I 
argue that receiving asylum seekers is in the national interest of the U.S. 
and Canadian states.  Since STCA has not yet enhanced the security of 
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the border, the state and the person who moves, the needs of security will 
demand attention and U.S. and Canadian state action.   
 There were a number of issues raised in my field work issues that 
were not addressed by the literature.  These topics include: the 
relationship between SBA and STCA, the binary of refugee and state 
agency, the impact of STCA on specific populations such as Haitians and 
Colombians, the concept of a “safe” country and the competing agendas 
within governments that influence migration control.  I will discuss these 
issues in Chapter 3.   
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Chapter 2:  Paper versus Practice 
 In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate the contradictions between the 
officially stated goals of the U.S. and Canadian governments contained 
within the final text of STCA and the practices actually pursued.  When I 
first read the final text of STCA, I was perplexed.  How would a regulatory 
policy achieve its stated goal of enhancing refugee protection?  Through 
my analysis of policy documents, I show that some of the official aims of 
STCA are not achieved and that the implementation of STCA has resulted 
in an erosion of asylum protection in North America.   
The final text of STCA states responsibility sharing and cooperation 
on managing flows as the goals of STCA.  In contrast, other government 
documents and various sources demonstrate that the reduction of asylum 
flows is the desired outcome of STCA and in the interest of the U.S. and 
Canadian governments.     
In the final text of STCA the U.S. Government and Canadian 
Government present STCA as a bilateral agreement for sharing 
responsibility: “emphasizing that the United States and 
Canada…committed to the notion that cooperation and burden-sharing 
with respect to refugee status claimants can be enhanced…”  Before the 
implementation of STCA, the many asylum seekers traveled through the 
U.S. to make their claims in Canada.  According to UNHCR, in 2001, “over 
14,000 people applied for asylum in Canada at a US-Canada land border.  
This compares to about 200 people who applied for asylum on the US 
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side of the border.  In general, it is estimated that over half of all of 
Canada’s asylum claims (both at the border and inland) are made by 
people who transited through the US” (1).   
The official text of STCA states the aim as sharing the “burden” of 
refugee claimant flows.  In practice, the agreement serves to reduce the 
flow, not to “share” the flow of asylum seekers.  The reduction of flows is 
not an accidental outcome of STCA.  In contrast to the language used in 
the final text of STCA, the Canadian Government has expressed its 
wishes to reduce flows in North America in documents such as Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada’s (CIC) Annual Report to Parliament on 
Immigration for 2005.  Excerpts from the report blatantly applaud the 
reduction of asylum flows into Canada.  A decrease in numbers of asylum 
claimants is deemed a “positive results.”   
 
Many recent administrative measures have yielded positive results in the form of 
reduced intake and reduced inventories in some parts of the system.  Intake for 
2005 is projected to be a 15-year low at less than 20,000.  Intake is lower, due in 
part to a worldwide drop in refugee claims, and in part to measures that aim to 
reduce the number of asylum claims made within Canada from individuals who 
do not always have a genuine need for protection.  With a drop in asylum claims, 
CIC can ensure that the limited resources available are directed at those most in 
need of protection.  By June 2005, the IRB inventory had been reduced by more 
than half to 22,000, compared to a high of 51,600 in 2002. (CIC, Parliament 35) 
  
As a policy, STCA does not provide a mechanism to determine 
whether persons seeking asylum in Canada who are deflected to the U.S. 
under STCA eligibility requirements are genuine or non-bona fide 
refugees.  Without an assessment of the potential asylum seekers 
deflected to the U.S., the Canadian Government makes a hollow claim 
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that STCA enhances refugee protection for those who are in most need of 
protection.  The threshold screening interview conducted by the U.S. and 
Canadian border patrol agents merely adjudicates eligibility for asylum in 
the U.S. or Canada on the basis of STCA; it does not inquire as to why 
asylum seekers wish to make claims in Canada over the U.S. or vice 
versa.  Abell describes the threshold screening interview: “The potential or 
experienced persecution of the asylum seeker is not considered in the 
threshold screening interview for Safe Third.  Cases are not adjudicated 
on an individual basis, but rather people are assigned countries” (579).   
 Regarding the drop in refugee claims worldwide, the Canadian 
Government fails to acknowledge that there are potential refugees who 
are not able to or discouraged from accessing asylum across the globe; 
some asylum seekers may avoid formal systems due to fears of 
deportation or their mobility has been restricted in a way that prevents 
them from reaching a safe country to make asylum claims.   
  STCA is a policy of migration control that redistributes flows of 
asylum seekers between the U.S. and Canada.  However, the CIC’s 
discussion of the 15 year low of asylum claims during STCA’s first year of 
implementation is significant in that it demonstrates the redistribution of 
asylum flows from Canada to the U.S. and potentially beyond both 
countries.  Persons who hoped to seek asylum in Canada were either 
processed in the U.S. system or were deterred from traveling to the 
U.S./Canadian border formally.  It is difficult to measure how many 
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potential refugees were discouraged by the barrier erected by STCA and 
resultantly remained undocumented in the U.S., utilized informal channels 
of migration to cross the U.S./Canadian border, or remained in home or 
transit countries outside of North America.  Later in this chapter I will 
discuss the implications of Canada’s deflection of asylum seekers to the 
U.S. and the gravity of the fifty percent decrease of asylum claimants to 
Canada from the U.S. between 2003 and 2005 in Canada.   CIC groups 
STCA with a series of measures to reduce asylum flows, demonstrating 
that STCA is one piece of an agenda of exclusion from Canadian territory:  
 
CIC, in collaboration with CBSA, continues to look for ways to reduce the 
exploitation of Canada’s refugee system by individuals who do not have a 
genuine need for protection.  The introduction of the Safe Third Country 
Agreement with the U.S., judicious use of visitor visa requirements and the 
continued use of interdiction measures abroad have contributed to a decline of 
almost 20% in asylum claims made within Canada in 2004 in comparison to the 
previous year.  CIC expects that the number of asylum claimants will continue to 
decrease in 2005. (CIC, Parliament 39) 
  
STCA is part of a broader policy agenda of reducing flows via 
bilateral agreements, visa restrictions and aggressive interdiction as 
demonstrated in literature such as Mountz, Walters and Gibney.  The 
reduction of flows and the reduction of access are stated goals.  It is 
troubling that an agreement that officially aims to improve refugee 
protection is presented as one of the many strategies for reducing access 
to asylum. 
In addition to the CIC’s interpretation of STCA as a restrictive 
measure, non-governmental parties have interpreted STCA as a policy of 
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exclusion through their assessments. The Harvard report, Bordering on 
Failure, places STCA in a broader trend of the reduction of asylum access 
in the 4th finding: “The STCA contributes to a rapidly deteriorating refugee 
protection regime in North America”: 
 
Although beyond the scope of this report, the implications reach beyond the 
borders of the United States, as interdiction policies stretch to Mexico, other parts 
of the Americas, and throughout the world. The STCA is only one piece in a 
puzzle where refuges are trapped in their countries of origins, unable to flee, and 
are denied fundamental rights.  (Harvard 4) 
 
Just as the Canadian Government’s CIC presented STCA as one strategy 
in a broader agenda of reducing asylum flows, Macklin describes STCA 
as: 
 
…not the first or only tactic devised by the Canadian government to impede 
asylum seekers from reaching Canadian territory and claiming asylum…Canada 
is something of a pioneer in instruments of interdiction.  The tools range from 
carrier sanctions that punish private airlines and shipping lines from transporting 
improperly documented passengers, to imposition of visa requirements on so-
called ‘refugee-producing’ countries, to the interception and deflection of ships 
suspected of carrying migrants to Canada. (Macklin 5) 
  
The above analyses present an STCA that serves to share the 
“burden” of asylum processing with the goal of also reducing the “burden” 
of asylum seekers in North America.  The Canadian Government justifies 
STCA as a policy that will reduce “abuses” to its asylum processing 
system by non-genuine refugees; however, there is no evidence that 
STCA is accomplishing this goal. STCA does not provide a mechanism for 
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the Canadian Government to determine whether or not the asylum 
seekers being deflected to the U.S are genuine or non-genuine refugees.   
 
Failure to equalize systems 
The redirection of asylum flows that were headed towards Canada 
back to the U.S. has exacerbated the differences between the U.S. and 
Canadian asylum processing systems.  Specific populations of asylum 
seekers, notably Colombians, are faced with lower acceptance rates in the 
U.S. than in Canada.  One stated goal of STCA implementation is found in 
Article 8.2 of the STCA, when the U.S. Government and the Canadian 
Government describe their aim to “resolve differences” (to equalize) their 
systems.  “These procedures shall include mechanisms for resolving 
differences respecting the interpretation and implementation of the terms 
of this Agreement. Issues which cannot be resolved through these 
mechanisms shall be settled through diplomatic channels.”  STCA 
implementation does not inherently encourage equality in the systems.   
Through my research, I found that the U.S. and Canadian 
governments have not attempted to identify specific differences or to 
pursue routes to resolving the differences.  However, what would be the 
danger of the U.S. and Canadian states pursuing their officially stated aim 
of resolving differences?  As discussed in Chapter 1, research suggests 
that equalization would be a “race to the bottom” and an overall lowering 
of asylum processing standards.  
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The final text of the Agreement acknowledges that some 
differences between the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems exist, 
although it does not identify them.  Other official statements have 
described the two systems as “same” and “equal”.  By describing the U.S. 
and Canadian systems as equal, the states deny the reality that asylum 
seekers experience unequal treatment in North America, giving their 
preferences foundations.   
Former Canadian Immigration Minister, Coderre, describes the U.S. 
and Canadian systems as equal:  "The Safe Third Country Agreement 
addresses a fundamental concern about asylum shopping for economic 
advantage interfering with legitimate claims for refugee protection from 
those in genuine need," said the Minister. "Canada and the United States 
have the same commitment to refugee protection and the same 
international obligations. We also face a common challenge in managing 
access to our respective refugee determination systems” (Coderre 1).  In 
contrast, a number of experts and NGOs contend that the US and Canada 
do not make the same commitment to refugee protection or interpret their 
international obligations in the “same” manner.  Later in this chapter I will 
present statements from these sources.   
Similar to Coderre’s description of U.S. and Canadian systems, 
U.S. officials have been quoted as denying the existence of differences 
between the U.S. and Canada that would significantly impact asylum 
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seekers.  At a presentation to the U.S. House, the Director of Asylum at 
the Department of Homeland Security, Joseph Langlois describes the U.S. 
argument an exception for those transiting through the U.S. to make 
asylum claims in Canada.   
 
Several NGOs urged us to include a transit exception for persons who entered 
one country simply for the purpose of proceeding to the other to seek asylum 
there.  After considering this suggestion, both the U.S. and Canada agreed that 
such an exception should not be included.  The main reason is that a transit 
exception would require a significantly more complex process for determining 
whether an individual was subject to return under the agreement, which would 
prolong and complicate the determination process to the extent that it could 
eliminate the benefit of requiring these individuals to apply in the country of last 
presence. (Langlois 4)  
  
It is illogical to predict the trauma experienced by asylum seekers 
due to a lengthier processing system is greater than the trauma 
experienced by being forced to make a claim in a country that they have 
already traveled to in order to receive protection in a different country.  
Forcing an asylum seeker to claim asylum in the U.S. as opposed to 
Canada may result in deportation in addition to an experience of trauma.  
This excerpt also illustrates the struggle of the U.S. Government to 
manage asylum flows.  Attempting to determine the paths traveled by 
asylum seekers would “complicate” the management of asylum.  While a 
more complex processing system would be in the interest of the asylum 
seeker and enhance refugee protection (a stated aim of the STCA), 
Langlois’ statement demonstrates that the U.S. Government does not wish 
to pursue a route that would require additional resources.  Yet STCA does 
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increase the traffic of processing in the U.S. system by receiving the 
asylum seekers deflected from Canada under STCA.   
Despite the U.S. and Canadian governments stated goal to “resolve 
differences” between their systems, both governments rejected the 
implementation of a reconsideration mechanism which would explore and 
correct the differences between the U.S. and Canadian systems.  In 
addition, the reconsideration mechanism would provide the Canadian 
Government with a way to measure how many asylum seekers are 
genuine refugees and how many are non-genuine refugees who would 
“abuse” the Canadian asylum processing system.  Currently, there is no 
means for the Canadian Government to assess the impact of STCA on 
“abuse” reduction. The U.S. chapter of the Partnership report responds to 
UNHCR’s request for a reconsideration mechanism to be implemented as 
part of STCA:   
 
The Parties do not believe that an individual request for reconsideration of a 
threshold screening determination is necessary, because there are sufficient 
safeguards and oversight mechanisms in place to ensure that the Agreement is 
appropriately applied to each individual case. Neither the Agreement nor the 
Statement of Principles provides a right to request reconsideration of a 
determination that an asylum seeker should pursue his claim for protection in 
Canada or the U.S. pursuant to the Agreement. (United States, Partnership) 
  
By deeming both countries “safe” systems for processing, 
monitoring each individual case is not required or conducted by the U.S. 
and Canada. STCA does not call for the “safeguards” that would ensure 
fair processing of each case.  In the next section I discuss the reduction of 
asylum protection that has resulted from STCA’s implementation.  
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The differences matter 
 The U.S. and Canada have defended their systems as safe and 
nearly equal.  However, reports from non-governmental organizations 
demonstrate that these differences, whether ignored or acknowledged, 
have serious implications for asylum seekers in North America.  The 
Colombian asylum seeker population has been cited by many sources as 
greatly impacted by STCA (USCRI, Harvard, CCR) Since most Colombian 
asylum seekers face the geographic necessity of crossing through the 
U.S. to reach Canada, STCA creates a wall that results in their chances of 
obtaining asylum in North America being significantly diminished.   
 The Harvard report presents a case study of Colombian asylum 
seekers in order to illustrate the significant differences in the U.S. and 
Canadian acceptance rates.    
 
The danger posed by the STCA to refugee claimants is most clearly illuminated 
by the plight of Colombian refugees.  After the STCA went into effect, the number 
of Colombian refugees who entered Canada from the United States declined by 
approximately 82%.  While the acceptance rate in Canada was 81% in 2003 an 
2004 and 79% in 2005, the acceptance rate in the Unite States in Fiscal Year 
2004 was 45% for those who affirmatively applied and 28% for those appearing 
before an immigration judge.  Despite continued existence of serious, 
widespread human rights abuses in Colombia, several aspects of the U.S. 
asylum system pose major obstacles to Colombian refugees seeking protection 
in the United States.  Because of the STCA, Colombians who previously would 
have legally entered the Canadian asylum system are instead exposed to 
unnecessary danger and uncertainty in the United States. (Harvard 3) 
 
One U.S. law that has significantly diminished the chance for 
Colombian asylum seekers to gain refugee protection in the U.S. is the 
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REAL ID Act.  This law bars asylum seekers who have provided “material 
support” to terrorist organizations, regardless of the voluntary or 
involuntary nature of the exchange.  The conflict in Colombia has created 
an environment where innocent bystanders are coerced to provide some 
form of support to the paramilitaries.  According to the U.S. Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrations (USCRI), the REAL ID act has significantly 
reduced the possibility of asylum seekers obtaining protection in the U.S. 
 
The lack of an exception for those whose support was involuntary virtually halted 
the acceptance of Colombian refugees.  The Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stopped referring Colombian refugees to 
the United States for resettlement because it estimated that the material support 
provision would block 70 percent of applicants, and other potential resettlement 
countries might not accept those the United States branded as terrorists.  In one 
case, guerillas from the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia raped a 
woman, killed her husband, and stole their farm animals.  Because the guerillas 
took her animals, UNHCR believed the United States might deem her to have 
given material support to the guerillas. (USCRI 2) 
 
The UNHCR no longer refers Colombians to the U.S. for resettlement, but 
those Colombians who travel to the U.S. or through the U.S. to reach 
Canada are processed in the U.S. system.     
A Washington Post article raises the concern over excluding 
asylum on the basis of providing “material support” to terrorist groups: 
“Advocates for refugees add that people who were forced to aid terrorist 
fighters at gunpoint could be labeled as supporters and turned away…”  
The article discusses the individual case of a Colombian nurse who was 
not successful in obtaining asylum in the U.S.   
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A Colombian nurse living in California who declined to give her name said she 
was abducted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) outside 
of Bogotá and forced to treat one of their soldiers. She fled Colombia with her 
daughter in 2000 after her life was threatened in a note to her family. Her asylum 
request was rejected last year.  ‘I had no option,’ she said. ‘What will happen if I 
go back? I will be killed. They look for people. They know when they arrive at the 
airport. They have names.’ (Post 1) 
 
In addition to facing the reality of lower success rates in the U.S., 
refugees may prefer Canada for a variety of reasons.  Colombian asylum 
seekers may view the U.S. role in Colombia as a root cause of their 
displacement.  I interviewed Caitlin Brazill, a lawyer for Catholic Legal 
Services- Asylum Division, specializes in Colombian asylum casework.  
Brazill describes the “material support” bar as “one of the major obstacles, 
especially for those who were forced to pay ransom for their spouses or 
children.”  In some cases, the difficulty faced during the asylum application 
process in the U.S. can result in Colombians feeling “frustrated”.  Brazill 
generalized, “at least 15 of my clients have said, ‘I should have gone to 
Canada.  I should have gone to Spain’.”  
Colombia is not on the U.S. list of countries with visa restrictions; 
however, Brazill describes the process for obtaining a visa as “more 
restrictive”, noting that there is a growing market for fake visas, “they sell 
for three to five thousand U.S. dollars”.   
The Colombian population may not seek asylum in the U.S. since 
the U.S. is playing a role in their displacement.  The U.S. has been 
present in Colombia for over a century, most recently through the 
execution of Plan Colombia, a U.S. aid initiative to eradicate the growth of 
coca in the country.  Plan Colombia has been criticized as fueling the 
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conflict in Colombia by militarizing and displacing Colombians.  A deeper 
transnational analysis of U.S. involvement in Colombia is necessary and 
would illustrate the geopolitical structurings of asylum.   The U.S. may 
discriminate against asylum seekers from countries on the basis of 
political or geopolitical engagements (or disengagements).   
Colombian asylum seekers highlight differences between the U.S. 
and Canadian systems.  The outcomes of asylum adjudications in the two 
countries are dramatically different.  In addition to presenting the case 
study of Colombians, the Harvard report provides a summary of 
differences in the two systems that influence asylum success rates.   
One explanation for why the Canadian asylum system is more 
appealing to asylum seekers than the U.S. system is that: 
 
Prior to the STCA, individuals voluntarily entered Canada’s well-regulated 
refugee determination system because the Canadian system offered attractive 
incentives for legalizing status, such as protection from refoulement, employment 
authorization, and access to public education and health care, during pending 
asylum determinations. …Refugee claimants stranded in the United States 
frequently are statutorily barred from applying from asylum, and even those who 
are eligible for asylum have strong incentives not to regularize their status.  For 
example, asylum applicants in the United States cannot receive employment 
authorization, benefits, or government-sponsored legal representation while 
awaiting determination of their claim.  Further, individuals are wary of entering 
what is too often dysfunctional and arbitrary U.S. asylum system. (Harvard 21)   
  
The differences between the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems 
matter, in addition to the political histories and contemporary geopolitics.  
These result in material impacts and potentially different outcomes on 
claims for asylum seekers.  Until these differences are resolved in a way 
 - 48 - 
that closes the protection gaps and enhances refugee protection in both 
the U.S. and Canada, asylum seekers’ preferences are justified.   
 
A call for further investigation  
 Until the protection gaps are closed and the multiple issues 
surrounding the implementation of STCA are resolved, it is in the best 
interest of asylum seekers to revoke the policy.  Before a continuation of 
STCA, there is a need for further study and evaluation of STCA by the 
U.S. and Canadian governments, international organizations such as the 
UNHCR and the International Committee for the Red Cross as well as 
parties outside of the agreement such as think tanks, NGOs and 
academics.  The Partnership report’s evaluation of the implementation of 
STCA merely examines whether the policy was implemented as agreed by 
the U.S. and Canada.  The report does not assess the broad impacts of 
the policy on asylum flows and refugee protection.  In addition, none of the 
parties reexamine the basis of the agreement, which would involve an 
assessment of whether the U.S. and Canada are safe countries and 
exactly “how safe” they are.  
The UNHCR endorses STCA: 
 
Since the Agreement came into force, asylum seekers have been provided with 
access to a full and fair refugee status determination process in one country or 
the other. Implementation has been in full compliance with international refugee 
protection principles and in accordance with international human rights 
instruments. By establishing clear and consistent criteria for the allocation of 
responsibility for adjudicating asylum applications, an effective mechanism to 
share responsibility for providing protection to refugees in North America has 
been established. At the land borders, exceptions are being effectively 
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adjudicated and refugee claimants are treated fairly and with respect. By putting 
in place an orderly process, the Agreement has served to reduce the potential for 
misuse and strengthened public confidence in the integrity of both countries’ 
refugee determination systems. (UNHCR, Partnership) 
 
The UNHCR evaluated the adherence of the U.S. and Canadian 
governments to the measures set out in the policy of STCA.  The UNHCR 
argues that both states implemented the Agreement in a way that 
complies with international refugee obligations, but does not evaluate the 
broader issues surrounding the implementation of STCA and the 
arguments for its revocation.   
As of spring 2007, the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) 
provides the most comprehensive response to the Partnership report and 
asks the questions that were not discussed by the U.S. and Canadian 
governments or the UNHCR.  Opposition to STCA from CCR occurred 
before the signing of the Agreement, mobilizing protest from NGOs across 
Canada.   
The first formal challenge of STCA in Canada was in December 
2005, when CCR joined Amnesty International, the Canadian Council of 
Churches and a Colombian asylum seeker in the U.S. filed a lawsuit 
against the Canadian Government, claiming that Canada violates its 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its international refugee and 
humanitarian obligations as a party to the Agreement.  The parties call for 
a revocation of STCA on the grounds that the U.S. is not a “safe” country 
for asylum processing and that passing off responsibility of processing 
asylum seekers to the U.S. violates Canadian domestic and international 
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obligations.  This case is significant since it demonstrates the widespread 
opposition in Canada against STCA.   
Aside from the ongoing litigation of the lawsuit, CCR has produced 
a number of reports and press releases on STCA, some in direct response 
to Canadian, U.S. and UNHCR statements or reports.   
The CCR responds to the Partnership report through the CCR 
“Safe Third Brief to Standing Committee”, by calling for a reevaluation of 
the U.S. being considered a “safe” country for asylum processing. 
 
In November 2006, the CCR made a submission to Cabinet presenting evidence 
that, since the US was designated as a safe third country, there have been a 
series of developments that mean that the US fails to meet the safe third country 
test, according to the definition and the factors established in the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act. …This report failed to address the fundamental question 
of the impact of the Agreement on refugees.  It reviewed how the Agreement was 
being implemented and not what happened to refugees who were turned back at 
the border or who learned that the Canadian border was closed to them.  The 
report also failed to analyze developments in the US policies and practices and 
whether these mean that the US can no longer be properly considered a safe 
third country. (CCR, Brief) 
  
CCR discusses important areas for investigation that the UNHCR, 
U.S. and Canadian states did not pursue for their year review of STCA 
such as changes in asylum processing, the individual handling of cases 
and the counting of persons excluded by STCA.  An assessment was 
made of the implementation of STCA but not of the actual impact of the 
Agreement on persons seeking asylum in North America. 
 In addition to CCR’s appearance before the Standing Committee, 
CCR issued a report, Less Safe Than Ever in November 2006, which 
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directly responds to the Partnership report.  The argument of CCR focuses 
on the U.S. no longer being a “safe” country for asylum seekers: 
 
The federal Cabinet has the obligation under Canadian law to review the status 
of the U.S. as a safe third country. In light of the substantial changes in policy 
and practice in the U.S. since the last review, the U.S. can no longer be 
considered a safe third country, according to the definition and factors 
established in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (CCR, Less 37)   
 
Earlier on in the report, the CCR offers a description of detailed 
concerns of designating the U.S. a safe third country: 
 
…detention practices incompatible with international standards; eligibility bars to 
asylum (notably excluding most claimants who have been in the U.S. for more 
than a year); restrictive interpretations of the refugee definition (notably with 
respect to gender-based claims); patterns of discrimination, particularly against 
Muslims and Arabs; and eroding standards of procedural protections, such as 
restrictions on access to meaningful review by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
(CCR, Less 8) 
 
The CCR, at the minimum, is demanding that the Canadian 
Government review its designation of the U.S. as being a “safe” country 
for asylum seekers.  CCR hopes to achieve a revocation of STCA 
however it is not likely that this will occur due to the close trade 
relationship between the U.S. and Canada.   
 
Human smuggling as a response to STCA 
Among the many aspects of STCA that solicit further investigation, 
the influence of STCA on human smuggling and trafficking is of an urgent 
nature.  The Canada chapter of the Partnership report strikes down claims 
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that irregular movements across the border have increased since the 
implementation of STCA.  Below the Canadian government summarizes 
the concerns it has received regarding a potential increase in human 
smuggling due to STCA implementation: 
 
During the development phase and since implementation of the Agreement, 
considerable concern has been expressed by stakeholders and parliamentarians 
about the possible increase in irregular crossings resulting from the Agreement 
coming into force. Advocates believe that by limiting access at the land border 
POEs, claimants who fail to meet an exception may be forced to make 
dangerous crossings in order to gain access to the Canadian refugee 
determination system. (Canada, Partnership) 
 
The Canadian Government claims that there has been a decrease in 
human smuggling: 
 
However, since implementation, Canadian and U.S. law enforcement agencies 
report that apprehensions of irregular migrants known to have attempted to cross 
the international border declined (in both directions) in 2005 from the previous 
year. In 2005, there have been no appreciable shifts from the previous year 
noted in irregular migration to reflect diversion from the land border to either entry 
between ports or at air and marine POEs. (Canada, Partnership)   
 
The language used by the Canadian Government in this summary 
is passive, denying the agency of the state to execute interventions in 
smuggling networks.  The Canadian and U.S. governments have the 
power to intervene or to ignore informal border movements.  The 
Canadian Government notes found that all POEs processed fewer claims 
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for asylum over the course of the year.  The findings below are incomplete 
for an analysis of smuggling since they do not demonstrate an attempt to 
measure informal movements or persons not gaining access to U.S. and 
Canadian sovereign territory:  
 
The overall number of refugee claims decreased considerably from 2004 to 
2005 (approximately 23 percent), and the Agreement may have contributed to a 
particular decline in the number of land border claims (approximately 55 percent) 
from 2004 to 2005. However, this decrease has not been reflected in any 
appreciable shift of the same nationalities that traditionally entered claims at land 
borders to air or marine POEs or inland offices. Inland office claims have also 
decreased in 2005, but as a relative proportion of overall claims, the percentage 
of claims made inland has risen due to a larger decline in POE claims (Canada, 
Partnership) 
 
The fifty-five percent decrease in claims made at the land border 
raises a number of questions that are not answered by the U.S. 
Government, Canadian Government, or the UNHCR in the Partnership 
report.  Asylum claims for the Canadian system decreased by half within 
the first year of the implementation of STCA because the asylum seekers 
were either turned back to the U.S. or deterred from traveling to the 
U.S./Canadian border.  One cannot help but wonder how many asylum 
seekers remained undocumented in the U.S. or how many asylum 
seekers crossed from the U.S. into Canada by employing irregular 
migration tactics.  In the above excerpt, the Canadian Government claims 
that there has not been a “shift” in nationalities making claims in Canada 
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but does not provide statistics on acceptance rates for the various 
nationalities of asylum seekers.   
Table 1: Refugee Claim Intake in Canada by Year and Location 
Calendar 
Year  
Total  
Intake  
Canada-U.S. Land 
Border  
Airport Inland 
2002  33,461 10,856  4,693  17,912 
2003  31,893 10,940  4,179  16,774 
2004  25,521 8,896  3,456  13,169 
2005  19,735 4,033  3,337  12,365 
 
The statistics and analysis from the Canadian chapter of the 
Partnership report do not measure informal border crossings or those 
potential refugees that did not or could not reach the land border to make 
a claim. Additionally, the statistics do not speak to the persons in the U.S. 
and Canada who choose to remain underground due to STCA.  The 
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, who I interviewed, 
explained that human smuggling is “not a new phenomenon and not 
significantly worsened by STCA.”  However, increased regulation of 
irregular migration under STCA provides an incentive for the expansion of 
the smuggling industry.   
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The U.S. and Canadian governments lack data or have not 
released data to evaluate the impact of human smuggling.   Despite a lack 
of government issued evidence, there have been a number of informal 
border movements that have gained media attention.  Although news 
reports, both non-government and government, do not replace data 
analysis, they illustrate that illicit border flows are occurring in the time 
period following implementation of STCA and highlight specific 
populations experiencing difficulty in navigating North American asylum 
systems.  
A press release from the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) on February 14, 2006, described the apprehension of a 
smuggling network.  Through a joint investigation by U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and Canadian authorities 16 people were charged 
with “conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens into the United States, and also 
with harboring and transporting illegal aliens within the United States.”  
The indictment demonstrates the cooperation between the U.S. and 
Canada to combat irregular migration.  The press release quoted U.S. 
Attorney Murphy saying that “The charges are based upon the interdiction 
of at least 74 illegal aliens smuggled into the United States by the 
conspiracy, and the more than 2,000 incriminating telephone 
conversations intercepted by the RCMP during the latter part of 2005.”   
 - 56 - 
The discovery of this smuggling network occurred in 2005, the first 
year that STCA was implemented.  While this group of smugglers may not 
have increased their activity due to STCA, their assistance of moving at 
least 74 persons across the border is quite significant.  How many of the 
“illegal aliens” are persons in need of asylum?  How many potential 
refugees employed the services of this smuggling network to make their 
asylum claims?     
There was another major crackdown at the U.S./Canadian border in 
2005, during STCA’s first year; the discovery of a tunnel that connected 
the state of Washington and British Columbia.  This tunnel is the first 
discovered on the U.S./Canadian border.  An article from the USINFO 
archive reports the first tunnel discovered on the U.S./Canadian border in 
July 2005.  U.S. Attorney John McKay states that, “The presence of a 
tunnel on our northern border threatens the security of both countries, 
whether it is used to smuggle drugs, contraband or even terrorists.  
Shutting it down, just as it is completed, is a huge blow to these criminals” 
(USINFO 1). 
 McKay’s quote implies that he views all tunnel activity to be illegal 
and threatening to national security.  There is no mention of the tunnel 
being used by asylum seekers to reach sovereign territory to gain refugee 
protection.   
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The ICE news release that was included in the article discussed 
above, “Tunnel Discovered Between Canada and U.S.; Joint Investigation 
Leads to Arrest of Drug Smugglers,” illustrates the significance of the 
tunnel to the state:    
 
Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Seattle Field 
Division, Rodney Benson states ‘this tunnel seizure, the first of its kind on the 
United States and Canada border, is one of only 34 cross-border tunnels ever 
discovered in the United States.  This unregulated and uncontrolled point of entry 
could have constituted a real threat to the United States, not only in terms of drug 
trafficking, but to the national security of our nation. (USINFO 2) 
  
These government articles illustrate the intentional or unintentional 
disconnect made by government employees between border enforcement 
policies and illicit cross-border flows.  Crackdowns offer a glimpse into the 
market forces at work over the U.S./Canadian border.  People are buying 
and selling in order to increase their mobility and the market appears to be 
healthy during the early years of STCA.  
 However, governments intentionally may ignore these links.  The 
two news releases cited above made by the U.S. Government describe 
two high-profile crackdowns at the border.  These events may serve to 
offer a false appearance of border security through the apprehension of 
the migrant “others’” bodies.  While the U.S. and Canadian states chose to 
make the bodies involved in these networks visible, how many migrant 
bodies are being pushed out of sight in order to give the impression of 
effective border enforcement?   
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Without attempting to measure informal border movements, 
bureaucrats continue to claim that “there is no evidence” to back the claim 
of increased smuggling in response to policies such as STCA.  A lack of 
statistics makes it difficult to STCA’s role in border movements and to 
contest the hollow claims made by government servants.   
 
Eroding asylum 
As long as STCA continues to operate as part of a security agenda 
of migration control which includes exclusionary tactics such as 
interdiction, off-shore processing, and visa restrictions, support for asylum 
in the U.S. and Canada both within the government and outside will 
continue to erode.  The U.S. Government agreed to STCA in order to 
entice the Canadian Government to sign onto SBA.  Although garnering 
support for the institution of asylum is a stated goal of STCA, the policy 
inherently and structurally reduces the legitimacy of asylum processing.  
The U.S. and Canadian governments state that they aim to enhance the 
legitimacy of their respective asylum processing systems, “desiring 
to…strengthen the integrity of that institution (asylum) and the public 
support on which it depends” (STCA Final Text).  In turn, STCA reduces 
the level of refugee protection in North America by restricting the access 
of asylum seekers to the Canadian system for adjudication, a system that 
has historically higher acceptance rates for specific populations such as 
Colombians.   
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 The implementation of STCA has failed to “resolve differences” 
between the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems such as differential 
treatment of Colombians, benefits granted to asylum claimants during their 
processing period, security policies such as the REAL ID Act, and 
detention practices.  Prior to STCA some asylum seekers traveled to the 
country that best met their protection needs and where they enjoyed 
higher acceptance rates.  Asylum seekers are now at the mercy of the 
border patrol agent who distributes flows through the “threshold screening 
interview”.  The asylum seekers are the bodies of the U.S./Canadian 
border caught in the landslide of an eroding North American protection 
regime. 
In this chapter I have analyzed the official aims of STCA and the 
realities of implementation that do not serve these aims.  In the following 
chapter, I will present a reading of the policy from those directly involved 
with STCA through analyzing a series of interviews I conducted in 2006.  
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Chapter 3: Discussions of STCA 
This chapter presents and analyzes data gathered in 2006.  I 
conducted 20 interviews with government employees, academics and 
NGO employees regarding STCA.  The semi-structured interviews took 
place in Washington, DC, Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa.  While the 
majority of the interviews were conducted in person, some occurred by 
phone.  Generally speaking, the duration of the interviews was one hour.  I 
recorded interview notes by hand instead of voice recording the interviews 
because I was not allowed to bring recording devices into some of the 
interview venues.      
Some of the participants are named because these persons 
specifically requested that they be identified.  Those who made such 
requests were NGO employees, researchers and asylum lawyers.  I 
interviewed Janet Dench who serves as the Executive Director of the 
Canadian Council of Refugees (CCR) and Martin Jones who is a 
Research Associate for the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University 
in Ontario.   
The government servants requested to speak off the record and for 
purposes of protecting their identities; I do not provide titles of their 
positions or home departments within their governments.  The government 
interviewees are referred to with gender-neutral pseudonyms.  Within the 
U.S. federal government, I conducted interviews at the Department of 
State and the Department of Homeland Security.  Within the Canadian 
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Government, I conducted interviews with Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.   
I posed a series of questions regarding STCA.  My initial questions 
solicited information that would place STCA in the context of 
U.S./Canadian relations and increasing border security efforts such as the 
Smart Border Declaration and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of 
North America.  My secondary questions probed the function of STCA as 
an implemented policy.  Please refer to Appendix 2 for a list of interview 
questions.   My goal was to learn the motivation and impetus for the 
development and signing of STCA as one step to understand the policy’s 
impact on asylum seekers.  I attempted to identify the priorities of the 
parties involved in relation to border regulation.  
In this section, I will analyze the findings from the interviews 
conducted, paying particular attention to the points in which the 
discussions diverged and connected.  I aim to extract the themes, 
patterns, and debates contained within the discussions of Safe Third.  In 
addition, I seek to connect these findings to the broader debates in 
international refugee protection and security beyond the scopes of these 
interviews.   
 
The signing of STCA 
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 The series of questions that initiated dialogue during the interviews 
aimed to uncover the impetus for STCA.  Why was it signed when it was?  
What were the motivations of both nation-states?    
Participants’ responses demonstrated that the U.S. and Canada 
had different motivations for signing STCA and benefited from the 
Agreement in different ways.  The Canadian Government wanted to sign 
STCA in order to reduce the flow of asylum seekers to Canada from the 
U.S.  Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, described the 
Canadian asylum system as being “overburdened” prior to the signing of 
STCA and that public support was declining as a result of providing 
benefits to asylum seekers, particularly in the 1990s.  Morgan estimated 
that one third of all asylum seekers who arrived in Canada came from the 
U.S. and that very few went to the U.S. from Canada.  STCA requires the 
U.S. to process the asylum seekers who would have previously traveled to 
Canada to claim asylum.  Simply stated, the Canadian Government’s goal 
was to reduce the asylum seeker flow from the U.S. by having the U.S. 
increase processing.  Morgan described this joint processing as “sharing 
the burden” in managing asylum flows. 
I received a similar but expanded response from Canadian 
Government Representative, Jamie, who explained that STCA was signed 
for security purposes in addition to being a response to the “backlog” in 
the Canadian system.  The “backlog” refers to a period in Canadian 
asylum processing during the 1990s when the Immigration and Refugee 
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Board (IRB) was unable to quickly adjudicate the high volume of refugee 
claims.  The claims made by these two servants warrant an investigation 
into the documented changes in public opinion in Canada regarding 
refugee protection during the “backlog” period.  Additionally, research 
executed on the shifting numbers of refugees making claims in the 
Canadian system over the past two decades would be relevant. 
 The Canadian Government’s goal, as described by representatives 
Morgan and Jamie, to reduce asylum flows was achieved within the first 
year of STCA’s implementation.  According to the Canadian Government’s 
chapter in the Partnership report, the overall number of refugee claims 
dropped 23 percent between years 2004 and 2005.  The Canadian 
Government explains that “the Agreement may have contributed to a 
particular decline in the number of land border claims (approximately 
55 percent) from 2004 to 2005,” (Partnership Canada Chapter).  
According to Table 1 in the Canada chapter, in 2004, there were 8,896 
claims for refugee status in Canada made at the U.S./Canadian land 
border and this number decreased to 4,033 in 2005 (Partnership Canada 
Chapter).  A decrease in asylum flow intake at the land border was 
achieved with the implementation of STCA, serving Canada’s agenda of 
“burden-sharing”. 
In contrast, I found that the U.S. motivation for signing STCA was 
unclear since the U.S. does not directly “benefit” from the agreement in 
relation to asylum seeker flows.  U.S. Government Representative, Casey, 
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asked me to explore the following questions through my thesis research: 
“Why did the US sign it?  What does the US get? Does it work?”  Similarly, 
a Congressional Research Service employee, Bailey, asked me to explore 
“who benefits from STCA” because it is not clear how the U.S. 
Government benefits. I estimate that these questions were raised by 
persons inside and outside the government because STCA actually 
increases the amount of processing by the U.S. Government; STCA 
diverts potential Canadian refugee flows to the U.S. for handling.  Another 
possible explanation for these questions is that U.S. motivations regarding 
STCA were not articulated publicly.  The act of probing U.S. intentions 
surrounding STCA demonstrates that U.S. motivations were not clearly 
defined to all within the U.S. Government.   
 
Relationship between STCA and SBA 
The answers to these questions materialize when STCA is placed 
in the context of SBA.  STCA is not a policy that stands in isolation for the 
U.S. Government. The indirect benefits to the U.S. Government emerged 
from my discussions with bureaucrats on both sides of the border.  STCA 
is a bilateral agreement that the Canadian Government had wanted for at 
least a decade.  Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, 
described STCA as the piece that Canada had wanted for “20 years” and 
explained that the U.S. used it as a “carrot” to bring Canada on board with 
SBA.  According to Morgan, the U.S. performed “foot dragging” because it 
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had “less interest, a different self-interest” regarding STCA.   Similarly, the 
U.S. Government Representative, Alex, explained that “STCA was 
something Canada wanted for years” and that it was a way to “get Canada 
on board for the 30 point action plan”.  While dialogue surrounding the 
border had continued on some level between the U.S. and Canada for 
many years, the event of 9/11 provided the catalyst to negotiate a 
comprehensive border policy between the U.S. and Canada.  In the 
context of heightening security, STCA became part of the broad SBA, as 
one of the 32 points.  The U.S. signed onto STCA in order to gain 
Canada’s cooperation with SBA.  As Canadian Government 
Representative, Morgan, explained, “STCA and Smart Border were thrown 
together out of necessity of the focus on security post 9/11.  The basis of 
STCA was not security.”    
SBA serves a variety of agendas: trade efficiency, security and the 
reduction of asylum flows in North America.  It makes sense, therefore 
that the persons I interviewed provided very different responses to my 
questions regarding the purpose of Smart Border.  Since, “the basis of 
STCA was not security” (Morgan), how can STCA be included as an 
action point for the SBA?  How does SBA relate to asylum and refugee 
protection? 
One outcome of SBA desired by both governments is an increase 
in cross-border information sharing.  Canadian Government 
Representative, Jamie, described the most important aspects of SBA as 
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being the information sharing and trade efficiency.  United States 
Government Representative, Pat, suggested that the “Smart Border is 
about trade and efficiency, not terrorism.  STCA is not that significant.”  
Pat also noted that before 9/11 there was poor information sharing and 
said that now there is “constant communication”. 
In contradiction to the above claim, STCA does make provisions for 
the facilitation of information sharing.  Below are excerpts from the final 
text of the STCA.  Articles 7 and 8 specifically encourage information 
sharing.   
 
ARTICLE 7 
The Parties may: 
a. Exchange such information as may be necessary for the effective 
implementation of this Agreement subject to national laws and 
regulations.  This information shall not be disclosed by the Party 
of the receiving country except in accordance with its national 
laws and regulations.  The Parties shall seek to ensure that 
information is not exchanged or disclosed in such a way as to 
place refugee status claimants or their families at risk in their 
countries of origin.   
b. Exchange on a regular basis information on the laws, regulations 
and practices relating to their respective refugee status 
determination system.   
ARTICLE 8 
1.  
The Parties shall develop standard operating procedures to assist with the 
implementation of this Agreement.  These procedures shall include 
provisions for notification, to the country of last presence, in advance of 
the return of any refugee status claimant pursuant to this Agreement. 
 (Final Text of the Safe Third Country Agreement) 
  
In addition to information sharing and trade efficiency two interviewees 
raised the goal of minimizing security threats from Canada was raised by 
two interviewees. In response to my question regarding the priority of the 
Northern border for the United States, Lee Hamilton explained that, “The 
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border is a national security issue and problem”, explaining that the 
Northern border is “more of a focus” due to the Muslim population in 
Canada.  The U.S. has a larger Muslim population than Canada.  Thus, 
why is the Canadian Muslim population considered to be “more of a 
focus”?  Are Muslim Canadians viewed as security threats?   
At briefing at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, the officers discussed 
US/Canadian relations from their perspectives of working in the Embassy. 
I questioned the Economic Officer about the controversy and impact of the 
SBA and STCA.  Appropriate to his position, he discussed the need to 
maintain a healthy economic relationship with Canada but did not mention 
migration.  The Economic Officer stated that the goal is to make the 
border “safe but open to commerce, not to damage the economic 
relationship”.  Does this statement imply that a ‘safe’ border is one that is 
not open to asylum seekers?  Or that the cross-border movements of 
humans and goods for economic purposes take precedence over flows of 
persons in need of refugee protection?   
 In response to my questions regarding the motivations and 
purposes of STCA and SBA, neither refugee protection nor increasing 
access for asylum seekers were presented as priorities; these goals were 
not mentioned.   
 
Lack of information 
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 After probing the purpose of STCA, I asked questions regarding the 
impact of STCA in its first year of implementation.  What is STCA actually 
accomplishing or not accomplishing?  Is STCA enhancing refugee 
protection, as it officially aims to in its final text?  I also asked questions 
about the impact of STCA on migration flows across the border, 
specifically regarding its impact on human smuggling.  The responses that 
follow demonstrate the need for research on the impact of STCA on 
informal border movements such as smuggling and trafficking.  
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, acknowledged 
that, unfortunately, the impact of the policy was difficult to measure.  
Morgan explained that “smuggling is not a new phenomenon” and that 
there is no evidence that it is worse now as a result of STCA.   
Canadian Government Representative, Jamie, discussed the 
networks across the border.  It was confirmed that Vive la Casa in Buffalo 
coordinates with Canadian border officials; however it was not discussed 
in what ways.  Vive la Casa is a large NGO that assists asylum flows.  It is 
beyond the scope of this project to conduct a study of the ways in which 
STCA influences the structure of cross-border networks.  However, an 
investigation of the relationship between government, NGOs and asylum 
flows would be relevant to understanding the impact of STCA. This 
representative also stated that there is no evidence of an increase in 
smuggling and irregular migration but acknowledged that there is 
“pressure” for these movements to increase.  The above claims that 
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informal movements have not increased due to STCA are assertions 
made without evidence backing them and contradict the evidence 
presented in chapter 2 from secondary sources.   
There is research that evaluates the relationship between border 
policies and human smuggling (Mountz, Sharma).  Sharma offers insight 
into the impact of restrictive border policies on informal cross-border flows 
by problematizing the criminalization of persons who engage in and 
execute smuggling and trafficking plans by presenting these routes as 
migration strategies.  The migration strategies of smuggling and trafficking 
become more salient and necessary as state migration policies become 
more restrictive.   
 
…most people using migration as a survival strategy today are unable to move 
without the aid of smugglers who move people for profit instead of for reasons of 
social justice.  It is virtually impossible for migrants today to move without the 
assistance of forgers who produce the necessary identity papers for travel.  
Furthermore, clandestine migrations usually involve one form of deception or 
another at border crossings.  Often, but certainly not always, migrants experience 
coercion and even abuse during their journeys. (Sharma 91)   
  
In addition to debates within literature regarding human smuggling, 
there are historical examples of the smuggling and policy relationship.  An 
important piece of analyzing the influence of STCA on human smuggling 
would be a review of Safe Third’s impact on informal movements in 
Europe and, where possible, in North America.   
 In response to my question regarding an increase in human 
smuggling since STCA, Dench of the Canadian Council for Refugees 
replied that “we are just seeing the beginning of the human smuggling 
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increase.  There has not been a huge increase of inland claims but it may 
take some time.  And we must think about how many people just don’t 
have access now.”  Since informal movements and access are difficult to 
measure, an increase in inland claims would not necessarily indicate an 
increase of smuggling.   
In addition to monitoring informal movements, there is a lack of 
information regarding the processing of a case from start to finish.  How 
have the experiences of asylum seekers changed since STCA 
implementation?  Martin Jones, a refugee lawyer and researcher, 
emphasized the need to increase monitoring of case processing and 
asked, “Do people actually get removed?”  What are the details of 
detention, adjudication and deportation for asylum seekers processed 
under STCA?   
Persons within the U.S. Government are raising similar questions 
as well as those outside.  The United State Government Representative, 
Casey, asked a series of questions regarding the impact of STCA: “How 
are asylum seekers now processed?  Is U.S./Canadian integration 
permanent?  What are the federal and local responses?  What are the 
problems with non-identical obligations in both countries?” That 
government employees raise these questions a year after the policy’s 
implementation demonstrates the inadequacy of monitoring and 
communicating the impacts of STCA at multiple scales: the federal state, 
the individual asylum seeker, communities lining the border, and so on.  
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It is important to measure informal movements across the border in 
order to understand whether asylum seekers are having difficulty 
accessing asylum through formal channels and are resorting to informal 
migration strategies.  Do the U.S. and Canadian governments view 
measurement of these clandestine movements as priorities?  If informal 
movements were closely monitored and showed a significant increase 
since the implementation of STCA, it would demonstrate that people are 
using informal channels to gain refugee protection because the formal 
channels are insufficient or perceived to be by asylum seekers.  While 
states may view smuggling to be a “phenomenon” (as described by 
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan), smuggling often 
increases in response to the policies implemented by states.  As 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, in many cases, smuggling is in direct 
response to state policy.  It is possible that asylum seekers will employ 
smuggling networks as a means to reach the sovereign territories to make 
their asylum claims.   
Aside from the important questions of how to measure informal 
movements across the border, it is also important to develop ways to 
measure or estimate the number of asylum seekers who are not 
accessing the U.S. or Canadian systems at any level due to STCA.  How 
is STCA preventing or discouraging access to North American refugee 
protection?   
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The lack of information on informal border movements could be 
considered a security risk.  Canada’s system has been criticized by the 
U.S. Government for being too open and lenient in comparison to the U.S. 
system.  However, it could be argued that failing to monitor undocumented 
movements or to formalize the status of those estimated 12 million 
migrants in the U.S. who are undocumented is also a security risk.   
Dench explained that “the Canadian system does not create security risks 
necessarily.  The Canadian system is formal.”  The formality of the 
Canadian system refers to having a significantly smaller population of 
persons who are undocumented in Canada in contrast to the U.S.  The 
regulatory and deterrent functions of STCA may result in asylum seekers 
remaining undocumented in the U.S. or employing human smugglers to 
cross the U.S./Canadian border.  This possibility raises a number of 
concerns about the national and human security.   
 
Refugee agency versus state agency: an unnecessary binary 
The liberal state faces the paradox of maintaining open borders to 
trade and the movement of humans for the purposes of labor, while 
regulating the borders in regards to immigration and security.  As 
sovereign states exercise their right to control their territorial borders, 
refugee agency is pitted against the agency of the state.  As I discussed in 
chapter 1, there is a constant battle for inclusion and exclusion.   
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United States Government Representative, Sam, asked “Who 
chooses the new nation-state?  The asylum seeker or nation state?  If 
your state fails you, if you’re harmed should you have the right to 
choose?”  Sam contended that the state has the right to control its borders 
and that the state chooses who enters.  Without a defined “right to entry”, 
states manipulate these geographies of asylum to deny access without 
blatantly violating their international obligations to refugee protection.  
Regarding my question about the asylum seeker having the right to enter 
the state of their choice, Dench noted that, “There isn’t a spelled out ‘right 
to choose’ for asylum seekers but there’s no requirement that an asylum 
seeker must make a claim in his/her first safe country of presence.”   
While manipulating geographies of asylum for the purposes of 
reducing flows may serve the U.S. and Canadian states’ short term 
agendas, restricting asylum seeker mobility is not in the long term interest 
of the state.  Putting aside questions of the legality of refugee versus state 
agency, Dench emphasized that there are “moral questions of choice” as 
well:  “For refugees, most choices have already been taken away from 
them and they have suffered trauma.  So it is a respect issue.  You 
respect the refugee’s wishes to stay in Canada or the U.S. or to go to a 
different country.”   
Dench then tied the ‘right to choose’ to the national interest of the 
state:  “The state is better off having people who want to be there.  Forcing 
a state on them is senseless.  Let them choose and they are more willing 
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and able to contribute.  By thwarting refugee desires and the migration 
outcomes desired, the future is not promising.  Refugee choice is a long 
term policy interest.  The policies are too short sited right now.” Providing 
refugees with a “right to choose” would help the state improve its policies 
by serving as a gauge of efficacy.    
Jones explained that allowing refugees to choose their states for 
asylum processing provides states with indicators of protection gaps or 
systems that are effective in providing refugee protection.  Jones 
employed the idea of the asylum system being a “market”.  When I posed 
a question regarding the differences between the U.S. and Canadian 
asylum processing systems matter, he replied, “it seems to matter to 
asylum seekers themselves.  Choice becomes relevant in the way you 
look down upon spontaneous asylum seekers.  I’m a believer in the 
market.  There’s a reason that people want to go to Canada. There really 
must be more protection in Canada.”   
Dench presented the “absurdity” of STCA, by explaining, “The 
people getting to Canada were refugees.  If they weren’t, why wouldn’t 
they just stay in the U.S.?”  Geographically, it would not be logical for a 
migrant to prolong his or her journey by traveling through the U.S. to 
Canada.  There are few explanations for extending one’s trip, one being 
the need for a higher level of refugee protection or increased access to 
refugee protection. 
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The exercise of agency by refugees does not usurp state agency.  
The state can benefit from studying the choices that refugees make and 
the demands they place on the system.  In the long term, informed 
refugee choice may lead to more stable resettlement situations.  However, 
refugee agency challenges sovereignty.  As I explained in chapter 1, the 
regulation of the mobile body reinforces the sovereignty of the state.   
The regulation of the Haitian population through the application of 
STCA serves as an example of state agency usurping refugee agency.  
As presented in chapter 2, the U.S. and Canada formed a side agreement 
during the signature of STCA that made Canada responsible for resettling 
a number of Haitian refugees.  The Haitian displaced population has 
historically been a difficult population for the U.S. due to the proximity of 
Haitians to U.S. sovereign territory.  The U.S. practices interdiction to 
deflect the flows of Haitians before reaching U.S. soil in order to deny 
them access to asylum.  The U.S. Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants (USCRI) discusses the U.S. control of the Haitian population: 
 
The United States returned some 1,800 Haitian and 3,000 Cuban asylum 
seekers it interdicted on the high seas while they were trying to reach Florida.  
The only way the Haitians could claim asylum was to shout their claim out on the 
Coast Guard vessel prior to return, but even this did not always work.  The Coast 
Guard took those who passed the “shout” test to the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where Department of Homeland Security (DHS) asylum 
officers interviewed them on the merits of their claims.  DHS, however, did not 
permit those they found to be refugees to enter the United States, but continued 
to detain them until they could find another country to accept them.  (USCRI 2) 
 
Canadian Government Representative, Jamie, discussed the 
agreement regarding the resettlement of Haitians as an incentive for the 
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U.S in signing STCA.  In response to how STCA benefits the U.S. this 
representative listed information sharing and Canada’s agreement to 
resettle Haitians. 
Regarding the “deal” in STCA for the processing of Haitians, Dench 
explained that the U.S. Government interdicts boats of Haitian migrants, 
houses them at Guantanamo and sends them to Canada to be processed 
as asylum seekers.  The side deal of STCA demonstrates the U.S. 
utilization of policy to usurp the agency of displaced Haitians and to evade 
the geographical proximity of Haiti to the U.S.  Canada offered to resettle 
Haitians in order to make STCA more attractive to the U.S. (Macklin).   
 
What is “safe”? 
The foundation of STCA is that both the U.S. and Canadian 
systems of asylum processing are considered to be “safe”.  This United 
States Government Representative, Sam, stressed the concept of “safe” 
during our discussion of STCA, “What does STCA call for?  The concept 
of ‘safe’.  The concept that a country does not engage in refoulement.”   
There are a range of definitions and levels of “safe” that were 
presented in the interviews.  Sam acknowledged that the concept of “safe” 
for the U.S. and Canada is “debatable”.  Sam offered the posed the 
question regarding the U.S. asylum system, “Is the failure so egregious 
that we don’t have a reasonable system?  Our system assures that we will 
not commit refoulement…but we make mistakes.”  What version of “safe” 
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are the Canadian and U.S. governments adhering to?  The system as a 
whole being “safe” seems irrelevant when each case must be handled 
“safely”. 
What is a “safe” system.  Jones provided an interesting analysis of 
the “safe” concept and the “finger pointing” that goes on between the U.S. 
and Canada.  He agreed that not engaging in refoulement is the minimum 
consideration of being a “safe” country but that a country can engage in 
refoulement indirectly.  “If a state restricts many refugee convention rights 
which, in effect, pushes them to leave, then isn’t that refoulement?”  As 
Western states fortify entire regions from asylum flows, persons in need of 
protection have fewer opportunities to reach sovereign territory to make 
their asylum claims.  I argue that the trends discussed in chapter 1 of 
pushing asylum seekers away from sovereign territory through the 
externalizing and transnationalizing of borders is a form of refoulement 
(Mountz).   
Since the U.S. and Canada handle asylum cases in different ways, 
there is a demand from critics of STCA and from the UNHCR is that the 
U.S. and Canadian states implement an appeals mechanism.  This 
provision would allow asylum seekers to argue their case for applying in 
one country over the other.  The Canadian system is guided by the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of 2002 and the U.S. 
system is guided by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).  Pistone presents the policies governing the 
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U.S. asylum system such as the IIRIRA and the 1995 regulations which 
preceded the IIRIRA.   
 
The 1995 regulations also eliminated the automatic grant of a work permit when 
an application for asylum is filed.  Instead, a procedure was established whereby 
most work permits are not granted until after a person receives asylum or the 
application has been on file with the INS for 180 days.  Consequently, the 
prospect of receiving work authorization, long perceived as a magnet for frivolous 
asylum claims, was eliminated. (Pistone 4) 
 
U.S. Government representative, Sam, explained that a 
reconsideration or appeals mechanism for STCA is not necessary since 
both countries are deemed “safe”.  If an asylum seeker is not processed in 
the “safe” system of Canada, the asylum seeker will be processed in the 
“safe” system of the U.S.  However, the condition of “safe” does not 
require that the systems process claims in the same manner. Through 
discussions with interviewees, I learned that the differences in the systems 
have real implications for refugee protection.  Jones, for example, 
discussed how the U.S. and Canada interpret STCA and their international 
obligations differently, noting that two similar systems produce different 
results.  The reduction of access to asylum for Colombian asylum seekers 
was discussed in chapter 2.   
Many interviewees noted some differences as significant during our 
discussions.  A question emerges: how do these differences or a lack of 
equality among the two systems relate, if at all, to the “safety” of the 
systems?  The employee of the Congressional Research Service, Bailey, 
questioned the permanence of the policy and believed there was 
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likelihood that it would be challenged from the Canadian side.  Bailey cited 
the difference between U.S. and Canadian systems, explaining that 
“illegals” are given full constitutional rights under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, which is “different from us”.  The struggle over 
harmonization demonstrates the varied levels of protection offered by the 
U.S. and Canadian systems as well as presents the dangers of equalizing 
the systems to a reduced standard of refugee protection   
When discussing how Canada and the U.S. are comparably “safe” 
countries, Dench described Canada’s obligations to asylum seekers.  
“International obligations apply to each case.  Especially with gender 
based claims.  When someone steps onto Canadian soil, Canada needs 
to apply its interpretation of Safe Third and it is Canada’s responsibility.”   
One important difference between the Canadian and American asylum 
processing systems is that in the U.S. asylum seekers have one year 
limits to apply for asylum.  In Canada, there are no time limits.  Dench 
cited a lack of legal aid and social assistance making it difficult for asylum 
seekers, especially women, to apply for asylum under the one year bar.  
Pistone discusses the difficulty of asylum seekers to meet the one year 
bar for asylum in the U.S.  
 
…the conditions and circumstances surrounding the flight of asylum seekers 
prevent them from being able to handle the types of matters we would commonly 
expect other arriving immigrants to be able to. …From the moment most asylum 
seekers begin their flight from persecution, they are focused on mere survival.  
They are typically running away from personal danger and are primarily 
concerned with saving their lives.  When they arrive in the United States, they 
often cannot express their fears of persecution immediately or meet the 
application filing deadline necessary for asylum protection.  Because many 
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asylum seekers have been persecuted by their governments, they genuinely fear 
government officials and are unable or unwilling to tell the truth about their 
persecution to anyone they do not know and trust, let alone a uniformed official.  
Having been tortured or severely persecuted, many suffer from mental disorders 
that impeded their ability to talk about what happened to them.  (Pistone 6)   
 
A major debate among interview participants involved the 
significance of visa restrictions between the U.S. and Canada in relation to 
asylum processing.  The U.S. and Canada have different requirements on 
persons that need visas to travel to the U.S. or Canada.  If a country 
wants to reduce flows of persons from another country, a visa restriction 
could be imposed.  Many advocates for asylum seekers describe visa 
restrictions as measures for Western states to reduce the mobility of 
persons from specific countries.  
Canadian Government Representative, Jamie, listed the 
implementation issues of STCA as being the “direct backs” and detention 
practices.  This person described the visa discrepancies as “not a big 
deal”, meaning that the different visa requirements did not significantly 
alter the access to asylum in the U.S. and Canada.   
In contrast to the response of some government servants, Dench 
noted visa differences and usages as a “major issue”.  Canada and the 
U.S. impose visas in order to stop flows of asylum seekers from a certain 
country.  “So the people who need protection most do not get access to 
claim asylum.”  Ironically, more people come from countries without visa 
restrictions to claim asylum; states that do not have horrendous human 
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rights records, comparatively.  Dench cited the example of there being an 
increase of asylum seekers from Mexico making claims in North America.   
Dench continued: “It’s not that they don’t need protection.  It’s just 
that if you look at the people accessing the system, one may say that they 
are not in dire need of asylum or that people are abusing the system, 
undermining the system.  But the states are responsible for who is in the 
system.  And then they can use it as an argument to further reduce or 
deny access to the asylum system. This repackaging creates barriers for 
the people who need asylum most.”   
The visa issue does not actually fit within the debate of “safe”; it is 
the total denial of safe access in the name of security.  When states deny 
access to certain countries through visa restrictions, potential asylum 
seekers from those countries do not have the opportunity to evaluate the 
“safe” nature of the destination states’ asylum system.   
  In chapter 2, I presented a policy related documents that describe 
the U.S. and Canada as having the “same” or “similar” systems for asylum 
processing.  Contrasting the official policy claims, government servants 
acknowledged during these interviews that there are a number of 
differences between the two systems.  One of the stated goals of STCA is 
for the U.S. and Canada to resolve differences between their systems and 
to harmonize their approaches to asylum regulation.  I agree with the 
CCR’s request for a review of the “safe” nature of the U.S. system and for 
an evaluation of differences between the systems.  The differences are 
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recognized by government servants off the record; it is time for a public 
and transparent evaluation.   
 
Thanking the EU for STCA 
If safe third country agreements are not required by international 
refugee law then where did the U.S./Canadian STCA come from?  In 
response to my question regarding the forecast for the North American 
refugee protection regime, Dench responded by saying that she believes 
“we are heading towards Europe”.  My interview findings reinforce the 
literature that describes North American control policies as resulting from 
an Europeanization process.  The EU implemented STCA in 1989.  
Through discussion of the emergence of Safe Third Country as a policy 
concept, interviewees explained that the U.S. and Canada followed the 
EU STCA model that was implemented in the 1980s.  States look to one 
another for best practices in border enforcement (Mountz). U.S. 
Government Representative, Sam, presented STCA as an EU concept.  
Along with the circulation of exemplary practices, there is a circulation of 
pressure to create the tightest border.  This relates to the geography of the 
states’ territorial limits.  When the EU attempted to reduce asylum flows by 
fortifying its external borders, Canada felt pressured to do the same 
through bilateral cooperation with the U.S.  The pressure stems from the 
fear that asylum flows will be deflected from one region to another.  
Perhaps Canada believed that a reduction of asylum access in Europe 
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would increase flows to North America, increasing the “burden” of asylum 
processing for the Canadian state.  
Canadian Government representative, Morgan, explained that 
Canada is following the EU Safe Third model and learning from the EU’s 
difficulties with “asylum shopping” and the overburdening of benefit 
systems.  When placing this excerpt in the context of Europeanization of 
North American control strategies, Canada “learned” how to decrease 
access to asylum from the EU.   
 
The future of STCA 
I questioned interviewees about their expectations of the future of 
STCA.  Is STCA permanent?  Will STCA be expanded to include non-land 
POEs such as sea port, air port in addition to the land border? I found that 
the Canadian Government representatives expected STCA to expand to 
all POEs and that the U.S. Government representatives insisted that 
expansion would not occur.  The varied responses illustrate the struggle of 
states to balance their desires for total control of all POEs and the 
geographical realities prevent the attainment of total control. 
United States Representative, Sam, responded to my question 
regarding the potential expansion of STCA to non-land POEs by 
explaining that it was unlikely because only the land POE is “indisputably 
under the sovereign states control”.  U.S. representative, Pat, provided a 
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similar response by explaining that “there’s no clarity on non-land POEs.  
So, it is not going to happen and is not being considered.”   
The U.S. Government representatives may share the Canadian 
desire to expand STCA to all non-land POEs, but view it as a difficult task 
to define the limits of state sovereignty in an airport or in the ocean.  For 
example, where does US sovereign territory begin in the Miami airport- in 
the tunnel between the plane and the airport building?  On the runway?    
As demonstrated in the interviews, government employees 
understand that they are required to respond to asylum seekers who 
reach the land borders. When discussing the ability of states to control 
their land POEs, Jones explained that “when a migrant shows up at the 
border, Canada has already opened the door.  They are already there.  
You can’t practice interdiction then.  So, do we push them back out or let 
them stay?”   Both Dench and the United States Government 
representatives offer insights into why governments are increasing 
processing of potential flows away from the land border and sovereign 
territories.  These measures are intended to reduce asylum seeker intake 
while appearing to uphold obligations to refugee protection. 
 
Making sense of STCA 
The official language of STCA says it aims to enhance refugee 
protection and border security.  I have come to understand STCA to 
function as a policy of exclusion for refugees who wish to claim asylum in 
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Canada by traveling through the U.S. My goal was to understand the 
priorities for U.S. and Canadian policy makers and officials regarding 
STCA.   The interviews I conducted offered a variety of motivations and 
goals relating to STCA.  Some contradicted others.  The U.S. and 
Canadian representatives presented very different interests in entering 
STCA.   
In regards to the Canadian government’s motivations, my findings 
demonstrate that one aim of the Canadian Government in signing STCA 
was to achieve a reduction in asylum flows, confirming that the aim of 
STCA was to exclude potential refugees.  Canadian representative, 
Morgan, suggests that it was to reduce the flow of asylum seekers into 
Canada by having the U.S. “share the burden” of processing.  Although 
the U.S. and Canada are both signatories to the 1951 Convention, none of 
the government employees stated that refugee protection is the top priority 
of the policy, or even is a priority.  Immigration and refugee protection 
were not presented as being relevant to the SBA.  To have multiple 
discussions with policy makers about the motivations for the signing of 
STCA without any mention of refugee protection is disturbing; illustrating a 
cavernous gap between paper and practice.  In practice, STCA reduces 
the access to refugee protection in North America, operating as an 
exclusionary measure. 
As presented by the official policy statements and by the 
interviewees, STCA does not stand on its own; it is a piece in a larger 
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policy construction between the U.S. and Canada.  Since STCA does not 
accomplish what it claims to in terms of refugee protection, it must 
accomplish something else that is relevant to the U.S. and Canadian 
governments.  STCA is presented as a piece of the Smart Border Action 
Plan, a comprehensive policy that would make the border “smarter” and 
“safer”. If border regulation is not about the protection of migrants crossing 
the border, what does border regulation accomplish?  How does STCA fit 
into the “importance” of making the border more secure?  After 20 years of 
STCA not fitting naturally into border policy, how is it fitting now? 
United States Representative, Pat, described STCA as an incentive 
to bring Canada on board to Smart Border.  Yet, the focus of STCA is not 
on refugee protection.   While STCA is one point of our broader border 
plan and does not directly serve U.S. interests, it is impacting the lives of 
individuals in need of refugee protection in North America.  According to 
Pat, STCA may not be “that significant”.  However, the implementation of 
STCA has had significant and serious consequences for refugees who 
experience varying levels of exclusion regardless of where the policy falls 
on the list of priorities.   
Since STCA does not accomplish its officially stated goals, what 
does the policy accomplish for the states?  Or perhaps a better question 
is, what vision or broader policy for the state is furthered by STCA? 
Agendas of control are executed by the U.S. and Canadian states with the 
intention of reducing asylum flows.  The following interview excerpt 
 - 87 - 
demonstrates how STCA serves as a policy of control justified by the need 
for enhanced security.  At the U.S. Embassy briefing in Ottawa the officers 
discussed U.S./Canada relations from their perspectives of working in the 
Embassy.  The Political Officer discussed cooperation between the U.S. 
and Canada by describing the two countries as “partners in defense of 
North America”. In response to the language used by the Political Officer 
at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, I must ask: What do these and other 
government employees perceive what North America is being defended 
from?   
Some of the interviewees discussed the EU asylum system and 
policies as models for North American asylum processing. The mention of 
the EU Safe Third policy by Canadian Government Representative, 
Morgan, is important because it demonstrates that countries are looking to 
each other for common practices in the management of migration 
(Mountz).  It is important to place the U.S. and Canadian policies on the 
global stage of refugee protection and migration management.  Is the 
ultimate goal of countries such as Australia, Canada, the U.S. and EU 
countries to prevent or at least to manage the access to asylum seekers?  
While these states may not pursue that goal directly, the implementation 
of policies such as safe third country agreements reduces access to 
asylum.   
The danger of looking to other countries for effective asylum 
system models and policies is that these systems are constantly changing.  
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Systems are human constructions which lack permanency and can fall 
victim to changing political tides (Mountz).  For example, border regulation 
responds to geographical tactics of human smugglers just as human 
smuggling networks are designed in response to changes in border 
regulation strategies.    
Given the dynamic nature of systems, it is imperative that those 
working within and outside them constantly evaluate their effectiveness.  
Dench dispelled the argument that the Canadian system is “safer” than the 
U.S. system in an absolute way by emphasizing the “need to improve and 
share concern over what each other is doing.  Canada may not always be 
‘safe’; the system has its flaws.  Same with the U.S. system”.  It is 
important for us to hold those in the system accountable and to monitor 
the shifts in the system.  Let us not wait for the day the border has 
finalized itself; it will never arrive.   
The time has come for those inside and outside of STCA to 
respond to the unanswered questions of STCA.  CRS employee, Bailey, 
asked the question that many of the interviewees asked, “who benefits?”  I 
was shocked to hear a United States Government Representative, Casey, 
and others pose these same questions.  In light of the serious human 
impact of migration policy shifts or new policies, it is ethical to have these 
questions answered before individuals are affected by the policy.  Who is 
working to provide answers to these questions?  In what ways are the 
experiences of asylum seekers impacted by the policy?  I thought I would 
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discover the answers to my questions through existing research and my 
field work interviews.  Instead, the interview participants asked me to 
investigate questions surrounding STCA’s impact.  Researchers and 
government servants can collaborate on investigating the realities of 
STCA since asylum seekers themselves are negotiating them on a daily 
basis.   
 
“Safe”: a futile title 
 Lists of ‘safe’ countries can shift intentionally or unintentionally.  
States may intentionally reduce measures that provide a high quality of 
asylum access or implement measures that deny access altogether in 
order to reduce the overall flow of asylum seekers.   
 The act of deeming a country as ultimately ‘safe’ is irrelevant since 
each country must handle each individual case in a way that honors 
international obligations to refugee protection.  In order for a system to be 
‘safe’, the processing of each case must fulfill this title of “fair”.  I agree 
with United States Representative, Sam, that the U.S. is a relatively “safe” 
system for asylum processing compared to other systems but asylum 
processing must not be evaluated in relative terms; not all asylum seekers 
get equal treatment.  For example, the Colombian population has a 
significantly lower acceptance rate in the U.S. than in Canada.  The issue 
at hand is the treatment and protection of each individual asylum seeker.  
An asylum system must provide for the proper handling of each case.  The 
 - 90 - 
“mistakes” that sometimes occur, as described by Sam, can result in the 
loss of a human life.  Rather than designating countries “safe” for asylum 
processing, energy should be devoted by the international community to 
evaluate how levels of refugee protection vary depending on the asylum 
seekers’ geographical location at the time the claim is made.  While it is 
outside of the scope of this project to investigate the specific adjudication 
processes on multiple scales in the U.S. and Canada, a comparative 
analysis would be relevant to evaluating levels of refugee protection 
offered in North America.   
While the title “safe” is not adequate to describe an asylum system, 
the implementation of the STCA has made the debate about the concept 
of “safe” relevant to the reality of seeking asylum in North America. This 
concept is the justification for the STCA policy and translates into the 
actual experience of the asylum seeker.  The definition of a “safe third 
country” involves more than ensuring non-refoulement.  If the U.S. and 
Canada are failing to promote systems that welcome asylum seekers by 
promoting policies that reduce the quality of access to asylum seekers, 
then the ‘safety’ of the U.S. and Canada must come into question.   
 The mixture of priorities and motivations surrounding STCA 
presented by the interview participants suggest that a blurring of the 
security, migration and human rights regimes is occurring.  These systems 
were once very distinct, with different responsibilities and agendas. Now 
states present security as an umbrella which is all-encompassing.  The 
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North American security regime is dominating and compromising the aims 
of the others.   Systems are products of state visions.  The vision for North 
America post 9/11 gazes through a lens of security.   
Based on the interview with United States Government 
Representative, Sam, I gained a deeper understanding of the U.S. 
approach to the border: that a sovereign state has the right to control its 
border and that the U.S. has the right to decide who enters.  Regardless of 
the foundation of this person’s argument for state agency overriding 
refugee agency, debating the question of “who chooses the new nation 
state” in relation to asylum seekers seems irrelevant when they arrive at 
the border in need of protection.  Asylum seekers move regardless of the 
theoretical support for them.  Rather than refusing to process asylum 
seekers, the state must develop ways to process these migrant flows in 
accordance to its international obligations.  Flows of asylum seekers will 
not disappear since migration is a means of survival for many.  It is in the 
interest of the state to develop policies that respond to asylum flows which 
are sustainable in the long term.   
While states maintain the right to control the borders of their 
sovereign territory, it is important to recognize that providing asylum 
seekers with the freedom of choice is relevant to the national interests of 
states involved.  Asylum seekers aim to continue their asylum journeys 
until they believe they have reached a safe haven.  This raises the 
question: why is choice a controversial and thwarted concept in 
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government?  From my perspective, states aim to reduce flows in the 
short term without estimating the long term forecast.  The failure to 
forecast is illustrated by interview participants who asked me questions 
regarding the value of STCA as a policy.  The choices made by asylum 
seekers during their journeys for refugee protection speak of the 
protection gaps in systems and the potential quality of protection at 
system offers.  Why are the majority of asylum seekers in North America 
aiming to resettle in Canada?  How do the “market” forces demonstrate 
which system is “safer” or at least perceived to be “safer” by asylum 
seekers themselves?  Dench made the point that the current policies of 
the Canadian and the U.S. governments are short sighted.  
Acknowledging the long term interests of refugees should be included in 
the policy considerations of the governments.   
In addition to physical differences between the U.S. and Canadian 
asylum processing systems, the differences in motivations presented by 
the interviewees demonstrate that during the course of 2006, Canada and 
the U.S. currently have different visions of migration management.  The 
discrepancies in the answers regarding the expansion of STCA 
demonstrate that Canada and the U.S. are not harmonized.  Are they 
heading in that direction?  Is full harmonization sought or attainable?  How 
are the U.S. and Canada using each other, their relationship to 
accomplish their different visions of the sovereign state?  These questions 
are relevant to the experience of the asylum seeker.  The harmonization 
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process presents the danger of resulting in a lower level of refugee 
protection offered by the U.S. and Canada.  Differences in state visions 
will play out at the border where sovereign power is asserted.   
Dench mentioned the “North American perimeter” concept and the 
harmonization process that is attempting to achieve that ideal of territorial 
control.  “Canada will not give in completely to the U.S. because of 
sovereignty and the strong refugee advocacy community.”  However, 
these new imaginations of sovereignty may work together to create a wall 
around the U.S. and Canada.  The outcome of U.S./Canadian border 
renegotiations depend on the sovereignty that emerges from these 
processes.   
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, when questioned 
about the controversy and opposition surrounding STCA in Canada, 
responded, “there is a good deal of support, virtually no opposition”.  This 
representative believes that the argument can be made by the public that 
Canada’s system is still “too generous”, demonstrating this Morgan’s 
perception that there is space to create even more restrictive policies than 
STCA.  As demonstrated in previous chapters and by my interviews with 
non-governmental organization employees, researchers and asylum 
lawyers, there are a number of parties and individuals who oppose STCA.  
In the conclusion that follows, I discuss possible steps forward to reduce 
the protection gaps caused by STCA.   
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Conclusion: Will safe third ever be “safe”?   
STCA is a policy of migration control that redistributes flows of 
asylum seekers between the U.S. and Canada.  In practice, the regulatory 
policy of STCA functions as a policy of exclusion by deterring and 
discouraging people to seek sanctuary in North America.  During the first 
year of implementation, asylum claims made in Canada at the land border 
reached a 15 year low.  This suggests that persons who wished to seek 
asylum in Canada were either processed in the U.S. system or did not 
cross the U.S./Canadian border formally.  These potential refugees were 
deterred by the barrier erected by STCA and resultantly remained 
undocumented in the U.S., utilized informal channels of migration to cross 
the U.S./Canadian border, or remained in home or transit countries 
outside of North America.   
  Research on the U.S./Canadian border will never be final because 
the border is always altering in response to different flows at different 
geographical sites.  Walters presents a metaphor of anti-virus software 
that describes the nature of the new border: “It captures the fact that 
immigration control is not a static, once and for all time accomplishment 
but a dynamic, strategic affair – a field of tactics and counter-tactics” 
(255).  States have more agency than they recognize; it is state policy, 
among other factors, that feeds the demand for informal migration 
strategies.  The history of informal cross-border flows developing from 
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restrictive migration policies demonstrates that the impacts of Safe Third 
Country agreements on flows are not unpredictable.   
   Through the pursuit of this project, I found that there are a number 
of silences surrounding STCA.  While there are many secondary sources 
that discuss the impacts of STCA, as illustrated by chapters 1 and 2, there 
is a lack of government released data on the policy that would be useful to 
execute a comprehensive evaluation of STCA, which was demonstrated 
by my interviews with government employees.  Without more information 
on STCA, it is difficult to explore the exclusions and protection gaps that 
are currently hidden impacts of the policy.   
In order to uncover evidence to assess the extent that STCA 
functions as an exclusionary policy, the advocacy and international 
communities must pressure the U.S. and Canadian governments to 
release the following data: the nationalities of asylum seekers whom are 
diverted to U.S. and Canada under the application of STCA, the 
acceptance rates by nationality of those processed under STCA, the 
acceptance rates of persons pursuing gender-based claims,  and 
information on persons who are exempt and non-exempt on the basis of 
the “family” exception of STCA.  With this information, researchers could 
effectively conduct comparative studies of the protection offered by the 
U.S. and Canadian asylum processing systems and evaluate the impacts 
of STCA on protection, particularly for specific populations such as 
Colombian asylum seekers and those pursuing claims on the grounds of 
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gender persecution.  
 Since it may be difficult to encounter the formal data, it would be 
valuable for those interacting with persons impacted by STCA to conduct 
an informal data gathering.  NGOs serve as effective collection sites 
because they experience traffic of asylum seekers interacting with or 
deterred by STCA.   These sites could include NGOs along the 
U.S./Canadian border, NGOs in second countries such as Ecuador and 
NGOs within the U.S. and Canada that work with asylum seekers.  
Information collected by these NGOs would enable researchers to explore 
the impacts of STCA on human smuggling and trafficking, to gauge the 
number of potential refugees remaining undocumented in the U.S. 
because they are deterred by STCA and to assess the deterrent affect of 
STCA on asylum seekers in second countries of asylum such as 
Colombian asylum seekers in Ecuador.   
There are a number of ways to alter STCA in order to improve 
access to and the quality of protection in the U.S. and Canada.  The U.S. 
and Canadian governments could initiate a review of differences in their 
systems that may be resulting in protection gaps and begin a process to 
close these gaps.  The danger with this harmonization process is that it 
may result in a lower level of refugee protection in North America.  The 
advocacy community would need to participate in the harmonization 
process in order to pressure the U.S. and Canadian governments to strive 
for higher levels of protection.  Asylum seekers would benefit from a 
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broadened dialogue, increased consultation and frequent monitoring of the 
U.S. and Canadian governments with the advocacy communities.  Until 
protection is improved in the U.S., implementing an exemption from STCA 
for asylum seekers who are of nationalities that have historically different 
acceptance rates between the U.S. and Canada such as Colombian 
asylum seekers would alleviate the diminished or denied protection 
experienced by some asylum seekers under STCA.   
I have argued that STCA is a policy that is not sustainable in the 
long term and that asylum seekers will never achieve the same level of 
protection under STCA as they did before the policy’s implementation; 
safe third will never be “safe” because the U.S. and Canadian asylum 
systems will never be equal.  It is in the interest of the U.S. and Canadian 
states to reject the concept of safe third and to develop policies that 
enable asylum seekers to realize their asylum journeys. Through 
consultation with advocacy groups and the international community, the 
U.S. and Canada could close protection gaps and improve the quality of 
protection offered in North America.  By increasing the access to asylum 
and the quality of refugee protection in the U.S. and Canadian states, 
asylum seekers would make claims in both systems.  A balanced flow of 
asylum seekers can be achieved without regulatory policies such as 
STCA.    
Policies of control will never be fully effective in regulating, deterring 
or preventing the movement of asylum seekers.  The need for safe haven 
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persists and those persons in need will continue to move in order to 
survive. 
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Appendix 1: Final text of the Safe Third Country Agreement 
AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 
AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA  
FOR COOPERATION IN THE EXAMINATION 
OF REFUGEE STATUS CLAIMS 
FROM NATIONALS OF THIRD COUNTRIES 
  
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”), 
CONSIDERING that Canada is a party to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva, July 28, 1951 (the “Convention”), 
and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York, 
January 31, 1967 (the “Protocol”), that the United States is a party to the 
Protocol, and reaffirming their obligation to provide protection for refugees 
on their territory in accordance with these instruments; 
ACKNOWLEDGING in particular the international legal obligations of the 
Parties under the principle of non-refoulement set forth in the Convention 
and Protocol, as well as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, done at New York, 
December 10, 1984 (the “Torture Convention ”) and reaffirming their 
mutual obligations to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
RECOGNIZING and respecting the obligations of each Party under its 
immigration laws and policies; 
EMPHASIZING that the United States and Canada offer generous 
systems of refugee protection, recalling both countries’ traditions of 
assistance to refugees and displaced persons abroad, consistent with the 
principles of international solidarity that underpin the international refugee 
protection system, and committed to the notion that cooperation and 
burden-sharing with respect to refugee status claimants can be enhanced; 
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DESIRING to uphold asylum as an indispensable instrument of the 
international protection of refugees, and resolved to strengthen the 
integrity of that institution and the public support on which it depends; 
NOTING that refugee status claimants may arrive at the Canadian or 
United States land border directly from the other Party, territory where 
they could have found effective protection; 
CONVINCED, in keeping with advice from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its Executive Committee, that 
agreements among states may enhance the international protection of 
refugees by promoting the orderly handling of asylum applications by the 
responsible party and the principle of burden-sharing; 
AWARE that such sharing of responsibility must ensure in practice that 
persons in need of international protection are identified and that the 
possibility of indirect breaches of the fundamental principle of non-
refoulement are avoided, and therefore determined to safeguard for each 
refugee status claimant eligible to pursue a refugee status claim who 
comes within their jurisdiction, access to a full and fair refugee status 
determination procedure as a means to guarantee that the protections of 
the Convention, the Protocol, and the Torture Convention are effectively 
afforded; 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
1. In this Agreement,  
a. “Country of Last Presence” means that country, being 
either Canada or the United States, in which the refugee 
claimant was physically present immediately prior to making 
a refugee status claim at a land border port of entry.  
b. “Family Member” means the spouse, sons, daughters, 
parents, legal guardians, siblings, grandparents, 
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews.  
c. “Refugee Status Claim” means a request from a person to 
the government of either Party for protection consistent with 
the Convention or the Protocol, the Torture Convention, or 
other protection grounds in accordance with the respective 
laws of each Party.  
d. “Refugee Status Claimant” means any person who makes 
a refugee status claim in the territory of one of the Parties.  
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e. “Refugee Status Determination System” means the sum 
of laws and administrative and judicial practices employed 
by each Party’s national government for the purpose of 
adjudicating refugees status claims.  
f. “Unaccompanied Minor” means an unmarried refugee 
status claimant who has not yet reached his or her 
eighteenth birthday and does not have a parent or legal 
guardian in either Canada or the United States.  
2. Each Party shall apply this Agreement in respect of family members 
and unaccompanied minors consistent with its national law.  
ARTICLE 2 
This Agreement does not apply to refugee status claimants who are 
citizens of Canada or the United States or who, not having a country of 
nationality, are habitual residents of Canada or the United States. 
ARTICLE 3 
1. In order to ensure that refugee status claimants have access to a 
refugee status determination system, the Parties shall not return or 
remove a refugee status claimant referred by either Party under the 
terms of Article 4 to another country until an adjudication of the 
person’s refugee status claim has been made.  
2. The Parties shall not remove a refugee status claimant returned to 
the country of last presence under the terms of this Agreement to 
another country pursuant to any other safe third country agreement 
or regulatory designation.  
ARTICLE 4 
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, the Party of the country of last 
presence shall examine, in accordance with its refugee status 
determination system, the refugee status claim of any person who 
arrives at a land border port of entry on or after the effective date of 
this Agreement and makes a refugee status claim.  
2. Responsibility for determining the refugee status claim of any 
person referred to in paragraph 1 shall rest with the Party of the 
receiving country, and not the Party of the country of last presence, 
where the receiving Party determines that the person:  
a. Has in the territory of the receiving Party at least one family 
member who has had a refugee status claim granted or has 
been granted lawful status, other than as a visitor, in the 
receiving Party’s territory; or  
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b. Has in the territory of the receiving Party at least one family 
member who is at least 18 years of age and is not ineligible 
to pursue a refugee status claim in the receiving Party’s 
refugee status determination system and has such a claim 
pending; or  
c. Is an unaccompanied minor; or  
d. Arrived in the territory of the receiving Party:  
i. With a validly issued visa or other valid admission 
document, other than for transit, issued by the 
receiving Party; or  
ii. Not being required to obtain a visa by only the 
receiving Party.  
3. The Party of the country of last presence shall not be required to 
accept the return of a refugee status claimant until a final 
determination with respect to this Agreement is made by the 
receiving Party.  
4. Neither Party shall reconsider any decision that an individual 
qualifies for an exception under Articles 4 and 6 of this Agreement.  
ARTICLE 5 
In cases involving the removal of a person by one Party in transit through 
the territory of the other Party, the Parties agree as follows: 
a. Any person being removed from Canada in transit through the 
United States, who makes a refugee status claim in the United 
States, shall be returned to Canada to have the refugee status 
claim examined by and in accordance with the refugee status 
determination system of Canada.  
b. Any person being removed from the United States in transit through 
Canada, who makes a refugee status claim in Canada, and:  
i. whose refugee status claim has been rejected by the United 
States, shall be permitted onward movement to the country 
to which the person is being removed; or  
ii. who has not had a refugee status claim determined by the 
United States, shall be returned to the United States to have 
the refugee status claim examined by and in accordance 
with the refugee status determination system of the United 
States.  
ARTICLE 6 
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Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement, either Party may at its 
own discretion examine any refugee status claim made to that Party 
where it determines that it is in its public interest to do so. 
ARTICLE 7 
The Parties may: 
a. Exchange such information as may be necessary for the effective 
implementation of this Agreement subject to national laws and 
regulations. This information shall not be disclosed by the Party of 
the receiving country except in accordance with its national laws 
and regulations. The Parties shall seek to ensure that information is 
not exchanged or disclosed in such a way as to place refugee 
status claimants or their families at risk in their countries of origin.  
b. Exchange on a regular basis information on the laws, regulations 
and practices relating to their respective refugee status 
determination system.  
ARTICLE 8 
1. The Parties shall develop standard operating procedures to assist 
with the implementation of this Agreement. These procedures shall 
include provisions for notification, to the country of last presence, in 
advance of the return of any refugee status claimant pursuant to 
this Agreement.  
2. These procedures shall include mechanisms for resolving 
differences respecting the interpretation and implementation of the 
terms of this Agreement. Issues which cannot be resolved through 
these mechanisms shall be settled through diplomatic channels.  
3. The Parties agree to review this Agreement and its implementation. 
The first review shall take place not later than 12 months from the 
date of entry into force and shall be jointly conducted by 
representatives of each Party .The Parties shall invite the UNHCR 
to participate in this review. The Parties shall cooperate with 
UNHCR in the monitoring of this Agreement and seek input from 
non-governmental organizations.  
ARTICLE 9 
Both Parties shall, upon request, endeavor to assist the other in the 
resettlement of persons determined to require protection in appropriate 
circumstances . 
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ARTICLE 10 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of notes 
between the Parties indicating that each has completed the 
necessary domestic legal procedures for bringing the Agreement 
into force.  
2. Either Party may terminate this Agreement upon six months written 
notice to the other Party.  
3. Either Party may, upon written notice to the other Party, suspend 
for a period of up to three months application of this Agreement. 
Such suspension may be renewed for additional periods of up to 
three months. Either Party may, with the agreement of the other 
Party, suspend any part of this Agreement.  
4. The Parties may agree on any modification of or addition to this 
Agreement in writing. When so agreed, and approved in 
accordance with the applicable legal procedures of each Party, a 
modification or addition shall constitute an integral part of this 
Agreement.  
  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their 
respective governments, have signed this Agreement. 
DONE at Washington D.C., this 5th day of December 2002, in duplicate in 
the English and French languages, each text being equally authentic. 
  
FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
OF CANADA  
 FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 
 
Procedural Issues Associated with 
Implementing the Agreement for 
Cooperation in the Examination of 
Refugee Status Claims from 
Nationals of Third Countries 
 
Statement of Principles 
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The Parties intend to act according to the following principles: 
1. Opportunity for Third Party During Proceedings. Provided no 
undue delay results and it does not unduly interfere with the 
process, each Party will provide an opportunity for the applicant to 
have a person of his or her own choosing present at appropriate 
points during proceedings related to the Agreement. Details 
concerning access to proceedings will be set out in operational 
procedures.  
2. Proof of Family Relationship. Procedures will acknowledge that 
the burden of proof is on the applicant to satisfy the decision-maker 
that a family relationship exists and that the relative in question has 
the required status. Credible testimony may be sufficient to satisfy a 
decision-maker in the absence of documentary evidence or 
computer records. It may be appropriate in these circumstances to 
request that the applicant and the relative provide sworn 
statements attesting to their family relationship.  
3. Standard for Determining Eligibility for an Exception to the 
Agreement. The United States will use the preponderance of 
evidence standard to determine whether an applicant qualifies for 
an exception under the Agreement. Canada will use the balance of 
probabilities standard to determine whether an applicant qualifies 
for an exception under the Agreement. These standards are 
functionally equivalent.  
4. Review. Each Party will ensure that its procedures provide, at a 
minimum: (1) an opportunity for the applicant to understand the 
basis for the proposed determination; (2) an opportunity for the 
applicant to provide corrections or additional relevant information, 
provided it does not unduly delay the process; and (3) an 
opportunity for the applicant to have a separate decision-maker, 
who was not involved in preparing the proposed determination, 
review any proposed determination before it is finally made.  
5. Record of Interview and Eligibility Determination. Upon request 
and subject to national law, Canada and the United States will 
share all written materials pertaining to whether an applicant 
qualifies for an exception under the Agreement. Subject to national 
law, this information will also be available to the applicant.  
6. Requests to Reconsider Exception Determinations. Each Party 
will have the discretion to request reconsideration of a decision by 
either Party to deny an applicant’s request for an exception under 
the Agreement should new information, or information that has not 
previously been considered, come to light.  
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7. No Reconsideration of Positive Determinations. Neither Party 
will reconsider any decision that an applicant qualifies for an 
exception under the Agreement.  
8. Timeframe for Return Under the Agreement. Returns to the 
country of last presence under the Agreement must take place 
within 90 days after the original refugee status claim is made.  
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Appendix 2: Interview questions 
 
What were the motivations for the signing of STCA?  
What is your impression on Canadian/U.S. harmonization?  
 Is harmonization occurring?   
How is the experience of refugees at the border changing and how is it 
related to the policy changes?  
 What is the forecast for the permanence of the STCA policy and the 
impacts of its implementation? 
 
